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One hundred years after the Supreme Court invalidated a law 
regulating bakers’ working hours as a violation of liberty of contract in 
Lochner v. New York,1 the case and its legacy are at the forefront of debate 
over the Constitution.  
Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting in Lawrence v. Texas,2 argued that 
the Fourteenth Amendment no more protects the right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy than it protects the right to work “more than 60 hours 
per week in a bakery.”3 Conservative scholar Robert George, attacking the 
majority opinion in Lawrence and the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
 * Professor, George Mason University School of Law; email: DavidEBernstein@aol.com. The 
author thanks Michael Abramowicz, Barry Cushman, Michal Dorf, Jim Ely, Richard Friedman, and 
Timothy Zick for helpful comments. A preliminary, much shorter version of this paper was published 
as David E. Bernstein, The Lochner Story: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in 
Constitutional Law Stories (2003). The Law and Economics Center at George Mason University 
provided funding for this Article. 
 1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 3. Id. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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opinion recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, asserts that “it is 
important to make clear that what is going on in the state and federal 
courts is Lochnerizing on a massive scale.”4  
In United States v. United Foods,5 Justice Stephen Breyer, dissenting, 
criticized the majority for finding that the First Amendment imposes limits 
on government-coerced commercial speech. Breyer, citing Lochner, wrote: 
“I do not believe the First Amendment seeks to limit the Government’s 
economic regulatory choices in this way—any more than does the Due 
Process Clause.”6 Meanwhile, liberal legal commentators and scholars 
including Nat Hentoff,7 Jeffrey Rosen,8 Cass Sunstein,9 and Lincoln 
Caplan,10 warn the public that a purported “Constitution in Exile” 
movement11 that wants to revive Lochner is growing increasingly 
influential in conservative legal circles. Unless citizens are vigilant, they 
warn, President Bush will appoint Lochner sympathizers to the Supreme 
Court.12 
Demonization of Lochner and its “economic substantive due process” 
progeny is nothing new. According to the prevailing myth propagated by 
Progressives and New Dealers—and widely accepted even today13—
Supreme Court Justices of the Lochner period, influenced by pernicious 
Social Darwinist ideology, sought to impose their laissez-faire views on 
 4. Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and the Constitution: Historical and Contemporary 
Issues, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Apr. 11, 2005, at 5. 
 5. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 429 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Nat Hentoff, Whose Constitution Wins?, VILLAGE VOICE, May 10, 2005, at 28. 
 8. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, at 42. 
 9. Cass R. Sunstein, What if He Wins? Implications of George W. Bush’s Reelection: Hoover’s 
Court Rides Again, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 2004, at 27. 
 10. Lincoln Caplan, Four More Years: The Constitution in Exile, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 7, 
2004, at C1. 
 11. For criticism of the idea that there is any such movement, see, for example, David E. 
Bernstein, Barnett and Sunstein on the “Constitution in Exile” (Among Other Things), Volokh 
Conspiracy, Jan. 9, 2006, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2006_01_08-2006_01_14.shtml# 
1136844943. 
 12. As it turned out, President Bush’s initial two appointees, John Roberts and Samuel Alito, 
appear to be establishment conservatives who are unlikely to have any particular regard for Lochner. 
In fact, Roberts specifically condemned Lochner during his confirmation hearing. He said:  
You go to a case like the Lochner case, you can read that opinion today and it’s quite clear 
that they’re not interpreting the law, they’re making the law. The judgment is right there. 
They say, We don’t think it’s too much for a baker to work—whatever it was—13 hours a 
day. We think the legislature made a mistake in saying they should regulate this for their 
health. We don’t think it hurts their health at all. 
That’s right there in the opinion. You can look at that and see that they are substituting their 
judgment on a policy matter for what the legislature had said.  
Sept. 13, 2005, Transcript, http://www.veiled-chameleon.com/weblog/archives/000205.html. 
 13. See Rosen, supra note 8, for a recent uncritical rehashing of this myth. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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the American polity through a tendentious interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 The Justices, infected 
with class bias and infused with reactionary hatred of emerging social 
movements that sought to aid workers and the poor, were untroubled that 
their decisions favored large corporations and harmed working people.15 
Indeed, they allowed their prejudices to infect their broader constitutional 
jurisprudence as well as manifested in the Court’s invalidation of several 
major components of the New Deal.16 Heroic Progressive judges, legal 
scholars, and activists challenged these miscreants until Franklin 
Roosevelt and popular support for his New Deal regulatory program 
finally vanquished them.17 
This morality tale was contrived by Progressive and New Deal 
commentators18 who were far from unbiased observers in the debate over 
constitutional jurisprudence.19 The tale persisted in historical 
 14. See, e.g., FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE 
AND NONSENSE 95 (1986) (“The Justices of the [Lochner Court], steeped in the economics of Adam 
Smith and the sociology of Herbert Spencer, unabashedly read their philosophy into the 
Constitution.”). 
 15. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (1987) (claiming the 
Supreme Court engaged in a “willful defense of wealth and power”); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED 
A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 498 (4th ed. 1970) 
(arguing that Lochner era judges were “concerned primarily with protecting the property rights and 
vested interests of big business,” which manifested itself in the doctrine of freedom of contract). See 
generally James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Due Process Revisited, 44 VAND. L. REV. 213, 213 (1991) (“In 
many constitutional histories the presentation of economic issues between 1880 and 1937 resembles a 
Victorian melodrama. A dastardly Supreme Court is pictured as frustrating noble reformers who 
sought to impose beneficent regulations on giant business enterprises.”). 
 16. E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the 
National Industrial Recovery Act).  
 17. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective 
Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y Y.B. 53, 58 (stating that Justice 
Holmes’s dissent in Lochner “raised the spirits of the faithful and kept them hoping for a better day 
and a Court more attuned to contemporary realities”). 
 18. E.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1935); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
(1941); DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN (1936); FRED RODELL, NINE MEN, 
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955 (1955); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
THE SUPREME COURT, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT (1957). 
 19. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of 
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner Era 
Revisionism, Revised] (discussing how myths about the history of Lochner developed); Joseph F. Wall, 
Lochner v. New York: A Study in the Modernization of Constitutional Law, in AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, ECONOMIC EXPANSION, AND LAW 113, 132 (Joseph R. Frese & Jacob Judd eds., 
1978) (“The difficulty with this Social Darwinistic interpretation is that it was based upon no 
substantiating evidence.”); see also Nathan N. Frost et al., Courts Over Constitutions Revisited: 
Unwritten Constitutionalism in the States, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 333, 378 (“Any true student of the 
history of state constitutional law could have told us that substantive due process was not an invention 
of the late nineteenth century, did not have its roots in social Darwinism, and was not centrally 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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consciousness because it also played to, and to some extent confirmed, the 
political and ideological prejudices in favor of the modern regulatory state 
held by post-World War II constitutional scholars.20  
As Jack Balkin explains: 
The Lochner narrative that we have inherited from the New Deal 
projects on to the Supreme Court between 1897 to 1937 a series of 
undesirable traits—the very opposite of those characteristics that 
supporters of the New Deal settlement wanted to believe about 
themselves. The Old Court’s vices were the virtues of the New Deal 
settlement inverted. Thus, during the “Lochner Era” courts 
employed a rigid formalism that neglected social realities, while the 
New Deal engaged in a vigorous pragmatism that was keenly 
attuned to social and economic change. The Lochner Era Court 
imposed laissez-faire conservative values through its interpretations 
of national power and the Due Process Clause, while the New Deal 
brought flexible and pragmatic notions of national power that were 
necessary to protect the public interest. Finally, the Justices during 
the Lochner Era repeatedly overstepped their appropriate roles as 
judges by reading their own political values into the Constitution 
and second guessing the work of democratically elected legislatures 
and democratically accountable executive officials, while the New 
Deal revolution produced a new breed of Justices who believed in 
judicial restraint and appropriate respect for democratic processes in 
ordinary social and economic regulation.21 
A polemical argument with little factual basis therefore became the 
standard explanation of the Court’s liberty of contract decisions. 
The Lochner case itself initially played only a relatively minor role in 
this melodramatic tale. As discussed below,22 judges and legal scholars 
routinely heaped praise on Justice Holmes’s famous Lochner dissent 
calling for judicial deference to the legislature in reviewing economic 
regulations, but paid only passing attention to the majority opinion until 
designed to aid business in avoiding any and all forms of social regulation.”). 
 20. E.g., RICHARD HOFSTADER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 5–6 (rev. ed. 
1955); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, 
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE, 1865–1910, at 26–30 (1951); FRED RODELL, 
NINE MEN (1955); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
RETROSPECT (1957). 
 21. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 686 (2005). 
 22. See infra notes 274 to 330 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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the 1960s. Lochner was treated as having no more significance than other 
well-known liberty of contract cases.  
Starting with debate over Lochner’s legacy by several Supreme Court 
Justices in Griswold v. Connecticut,23 however, Lochner’s prominence 
gradually rose, until, by the 1980s, it became a leading case in the “anti-
canon,” the group of wrongly decided cases that help frame what the 
proper principles of constitutional interpretation should be.24 Along with 
Dred Scott v. Sanford25 and Plessy v. Ferguson,26 Lochner has become one 
of the most reviled Supreme Court cases of all time. An entire period of 
discredited constitutional jurisprudence is now known as “the Lochner 
era”—a phrase that, as we will see, was virtually unknown until 1970.  
While the traditional Progressive Lochner morality tale continues to 
dominate constitutional debate, over the last two decades or so revisionist 
scholars have thoroughly debunked the tale’s historical underpinnings. 
Revisionists have successfully challenged conventional wisdom ranging 
from the Court’s purported Social Darwinist inclinations to the claim that 
Lochnerian liberty of contract cases clearly benefited the strong and 
powerful over the weak and helpless.27  
This Article, prepared for Lochner’s centennial, discusses two aspects 
of Lochner’s history that have not yet been adequately addressed by the 
scholarly literature on the case. Part I of the Article discusses the historical 
background of the Lochner case. The Article pays particular attention to 
the competing interest group pressures that led to the passage of the sixty-
hour law at issue; the jurisprudential traditions that the parties appealed to 
in their arguments to the Court; the somewhat anomalous nature of the 
 23. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 24. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing 
Lochner’s anticanonical staus) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy]; Richard A. 
Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (describing the anti-
canon). 
 25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 27. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, 
LABOR REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001) 
(contending that liberty of contract jurisprudence benefited disenfranchised African Americans); 
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998) (arguing that the seeds of the 
abandonment of Lochner by the New Deal era Court were sown by weaknesses and concessions in 
Lochner era decisions concerning the scope of the states’ police powers); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 
(1993) (locating Lochner’s origins in traditional judicial hostility to class legislation); MICHAEL J. 
PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S 
TO THE 1930S (2000) (finding that the Lochner era Court rarely invalidated economic regulations on 
“substantive due process” grounds, and that when it did, its decisions usually had positive economic 
consequences). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Court’s invalidation of the law; and how to understand the Court’s opinion 
on its own terms, shorn of the baggage of decades of careless and 
questionable historiography. In short, Part I places the Lochner opinion 
firmly in its historical context. 
Part II of this Article explains how Lochner, which existed in relative 
obscurity for decades, became a leading anti-canonical case. As discussed 
in Part II, Lochner’s modern notoriety arose largely because although the 
Roosevelt Supreme Court abandoned Lochner with regard to judicial 
review of economic legislation, it preserved the Lochnerian Meyer v. 
Nebraska28 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.29 Meyer, in particular, later 
became an important basis for the Warren and Burger Courts’ substantive 
due process jurisprudence in the landmark cases of Griswold and Roe v. 
Wade.30 Not surprisingly, critics of those opinions attacked the Court for 
following in Lochner’s footsteps.  
Recently, the ghost of Lochner has been kept very much alive by 
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, each of whom has praised Meyer 
and Pierce as engaging in appropriately aggressive due process review of 
police power regulations, while straining to distinguish those opinions 
from Lochner.31 Meanwhile, a revival of limited government ideology on 
the legal right, most notably in the Rehnquist Court’s federalism opinions 
has raised (perhaps exaggerated) fears on the legal left that the 
conservatives seek to return, in spirit if not in letter, to the discredited 
jurisprudence of the Lochner era.32 Yet virtually no one, on either the right 
or the left, challenges what may be the strongest evidence of Lochner’s 
influence on modern jurisprudence: the Supreme Court’s use of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to protect both enumerated 
and unenumerated individual rights against the states. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
For such an important decision, the Lochner case had inauspicious 
origins. The story of Lochner begins in the late nineteenth century with 
agitation by unionized New York bread bakers who sought to limit their 
working hours to ten hours per day and sixty hours per week. Bakers 
favored shorter hours because they wanted more leisure time, and because 
 28. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 29. Brief for appellee, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496). 
 30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 31. See infra Part II. 
 32. See Rosen, supra note 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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they were typically paid by the day. If bakers were paid two dollars a day 
for twelve hours of work, they expected to get paid the same two dollars 
for ten hours a day of work (though employers would obviously try to 
switch to hourly pay schedules). Also, many bakers apparently believed 
that shorter hours would eventually lead to higher wages, though it is not 
clear by what mechanism they thought this would occur.33 Bakers’ 
demands for a ten-hour day increased in periods of economic hardship, 
when many bakers could not find work. Bakers thought that limiting the 
hours of labor would result in jobs being spread among more bakers, 
thereby reducing unemployment and want among them.34 
Bakers also sought shorter hours because baking was an unpleasant 
and, many believed, an unhealthful profession. Bakers were exposed to 
flour dust, gas fumes, dampness, and extremes of hot and cold. On the 
other hand, unlike many other workers, bakers faced almost no risk of 
sudden death or catastrophic injury.35 The bakers’ primary health 
complaint was that they believed themselves to be at increased risk of 
developing “consumption,” an ill-defined catch-all for lung diseases.36 The 
most common form of consumption was tuberculosis. Even though late 
nineteenth century scientists knew that tuberculosis was caused by 
contagious bacteria and not by lifestyle and environment, many bakers and 
their reformist allies insisted that long hours of exposure to various 
airborne particles caused the disease.37  
 33. Unconstitutional, BAKER’S J., May 6, 1905, at 1 (“Those who know their economics, and 
those who are acquainted with the history of wages in this state, are aware that the shorter work day 
eventually results in increased wages . . . .”); Bakeshop Legislation, BAKER’S J., Sept. 1, 1897, at 52 
(stating that it is a “well established fact that the workmen who work longest receive the lowest 
wages.”). 
 34. Now for the Ten-Hour Day, BAKER’S J., Apr. 20, 1895, at 1. See also Matthew S. Bewig, 
Lochner v. The Journeymen Bakers of New York: The Journeymen Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and 
the Constitution—A Case Study in the Social History of Legal Thought, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 413, 
440 (1994) (stating that this was the “primary argument” advanced by bakers for shorter hours). 
 35. PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW 
YORK  9 (1990). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 9–11. For an argument that the bakers’ health concerns were at least consistent with 
mainstream contemporary medical views that working conditions and general well-being could affect 
susceptibility to consumption, see Matthew S. Bewig, Laboring in the “Poisonous Gases”: 
Consumption, Public Health, and the Lochner Court, 1 NYU J. L. & LIB. 476, 484 (2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. The Sixty Hours Law: A Health Law or a Study in Interest Group 
Conflict? 
By 1887 unionized New York bakers had grown frustrated with efforts 
to obtain a uniform ten-hour day through negotiation, and therefore drafted 
a bill for submission to the legislature limiting bakers’ hours to ten per 
day. The bill was defeated in the state assembly by a vote of fifty-six to 
forty-five.38 The labor market, however, began to address the hours issue. 
As American living standards improved because of economic growth and 
increases in productivity, working conditions gradually improved for 
bakers. Modern, sanitary, and efficient bread bakeries increased their 
market share at the expense of traditional smaller bakeries. The larger New 
York bakeries tended to be unionized, and were staffed by bakers of 
Anglo-Irish and (primarily) German descent;39 the latter group came to 
dominate the Bakery and Confectionery Workers’ International Union 
(“the bakers’ union”).40 The smaller bakeries employed a hodgepodge of 
ethnic groups, primarily French, Germans, Italians, and Jews, usually 
segregated by bakery and generally working for employers of the same 
ethnic group. Employees of smaller bakeries were generally not unionized, 
especially among the non-Germans.41 
By the mid-1890s, bakers in large bakeries rarely worked more than ten 
hours per day, sixty hours per week.42 However, these bakers were 
concerned that their improved situation was endangered by competition 
from small, old-fashioned bakeries, especially those that employed Italian, 
 38. The Demonstrations of the Bakers of New York and Brooklyn, BAKER’S J., Apr. 27, 1895, at 
1. Bakers’ unions in Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, D.C. also failed in their attempts to 
promote bakery legislation around this time. STUART BRUCE KAUFMAN, A VISION OF UNITY: THE 
HISTORY OF THE BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 31 (1986). 
 39. See DOROTHEE SCHNEIDER, TRADE UNIONS AND COMMUNITY: THE GERMAN WORKING 
CLASS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1870–1900, at 204 (1994); Dorothee Schneider, The German Bakers of 
New York City: Between Ethnic Particularism and Working-Class Consciousness, in THE POLITICS OF 
IMMIGRANT WORKERS 49, 62 (Camille Guein-Gonzales & Carl Strikwerda eds., 1993). Given that the 
bakers’ union later called for a complete ban on small, less modern basement bakeries, it seems safe to 
assume that most of their members did not work in such bakeries. See infra text accompanying notes 
91–92. 
 40. As late as May 1903, the editors of the Baker’s Journal estimated that at least half of the 
union members nationwide were fluent in German and not English. Two Journals, BAKER’S J., May 
30, 1903, at 1.  
 41. SCHNEIDER, supra note 39, at 204–05. 
 42. TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY INSPECTORS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 42 
(1896) [hereinafter FACTORY INSPECTORS’ REPORT]; Employees Alone Benefited, BROOKLYN EAGLE, 
May 17, 1896, at 5 (quoting a “wholesale baker” as stating that in bakeries such as his, the ten-hour 
law would have no effect, because unlike in small bakeries, in wholesale bakeries the work is done in 
approximately ten-hour shifts). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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French, and Jewish immigrants. These old-fashioned bakeries were often 
located in the basement of tenement buildings to take advantage of cheap 
rents and floors sturdy enough to withstand the weight of heavy baking 
ovens.43 Unlike the more modern “factory” bakeries, which operated in 
shifts, the basement bakeries often demanded that workers be on call 
twenty-four hours a day, with the bakers sleeping in or near the bakery 
during down times. Workers in such bakeries often worked far more than 
ten hours per day.44 
Union bakers believed that competition from basement bakery workers 
drove down their wages.45 An article in the bakers’ union’s weekly 
newspaper, the Baker’s Journal,46 condemned “the cheap labor of the 
green hand [a euphemism for recent immigrants] from foreign shores” 
that, along with long hours and competition from underpaid apprentices, 
“has driven countless numbers of journeymen [bakers] into other walks of 
life, into the streets, the hospitals, alms houses, insane asylums, 
penitentiaries and finally death through poverty and desperation.”47 A ten-
 43. KENS, supra note 35, at 8; Paul Brenner, The Formative Years of the Hebrew Bakers’ 
Unions, 1881–1914, 18 YIVO ANN. OF JEWISH SOC. SCI. 39, 41 (1983). Jewish bakers did not compete 
directly with German bakers because the Jewish-owned bakeries supplied the kosher market, a market 
the German bakers could not supply. However, while observant Jews could not eat non-kosher bread, 
non-Jews could eat kosher bread, so there was a danger that Jewish bakers would come to dominate 
the general New York bread market. See Brenner, supra, at 55–56 (“Faced with the prospect of having 
its overwhelmingly German membership literally driven out of the New York labor market, the Union 
had a substantial incentive to reduce existing wage-and-hour disparities by lifting the standards of 
Jewish workers.”). 
 44. Dennis Hanlon, Inspection of Bake-Shops, in NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FACTORY INSPECTORS OF NORTH AMERICA 14–15 (1895) (stating 
that bakers’ lodging often involved sleeping in bakeries, sometimes in bakerooms); Brenner, supra 
note 43, at 42 (noting that for Jewish bakers on the day before the Sabbath “[r]est was available only 
while the batches of dough were rising” and that bakers “were usually required to board and lodge 
with their employers”); Complaints of the Bakers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1895, at 9 (“The majority of 
the men board with the ‘bosses’ and sleep in the bakeshop. They work fifteen or sixteen hours a day 
. . . .” (quoting Charles Iffland, manager of the bakers’ union)). 
 45. FACTORY INSPECTORS’ REPORT, supra note 42, at 42–43. 
 46. From 1885 to 1895, the bakers’ union’s primary publication was the German-language 
Baecher-Zeitung, with English-language Baker’s Journal providing a summary of the German 
contents starting in 1887. In mid-1895, the union began publishing a combined journal, half in English 
and half in German, with both titles.  
 47. Now for the Ten-Hour Day, supra note 34. See also For the Abolition of Saturday-Night and 
Sunday Work, BAKER’S J., Oct. 15, 1897, at 102 (discussing the reluctance of French bakers to 
unionize, and the negative effect this reluctance had on the movement to abolish work on Saturday 
nights and Sundays); Non-Union Bakeries, BAKER’S J., Aug. 19, 1905, at 1 (“We also wish to call your 
attention to the fact that all French and Italian bread is non-union. All of your efforts to unionize their 
bakers have been so far in vain, having met with the severest opposition by both employers and 
employees.”); The Jewish Bakers Strike in New York, BAKER’S J., Sept. 23, 1905, at 1 (stating that 
Jewish bakers were mostly unorganized, but did organize for a strike in 1905). 
 For a discussion of the on-again off-again unionization of Jewish bakers, see generally Brenner, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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hour day law would not only aid those unionized bakers who had not 
successfully demanded their hours be reduced, but would also help reduce 
competition from nonunionized workers.48 
Immigrant bakers who were not part of the established German group, 
especially the French, were notoriously difficult to unionize, and remained 
largely oblivious to pleas from the bakers’ union.49 Evidently, other bakers 
believed that the union primarily served the interests of their German 
rivals. The bakers’ union, for example, organized a Jewish section in New 
York City in 1893, but it attracted almost exclusively “German-speaking 
Jews, who would probably have joined the unions even if separate Jewish 
sections had not existed.”50 Yiddish-speaking Jews, the overwhelming 
majority of Jewish bakers, were not interested. Even native-born English-
speaking bakers, who had once been active in the defunct bakers’ union 
associated with the Knights of Labor, rarely joined the newly powerful 
and German-dominated Bakery and Confectionery Workers’ International 
Union.51 In any event, the union expended relatively little effort in 
organizing non-Germans, preferring to spend their energies lobbying for 
favorable legislation instead.52 
The bakers’ union’s political fortunes grew under the leadership of 
Henry Weismann, a German immigrant who came to the United States as 
a young adult. He initially settled in California, where he was active in the 
union-sponsored Anti-Coolie League of California, which was violently 
opposed to the presence of Chinese workers in the U.S.53 After a jail term 
for possession of explosives, Weismann, who had anarchist sympathies,54 
became involved in organizing for the bakers’ union. He moved to New 
York in 1890 to become editor of the Baker’s Journal. By 1894 he was the 
supra note 43. Unionization did not take strong hold among the Jewish bakers until 1909. Id. at 97–
101. 
 48. See Now for the Ten-Hour Day, supra note 34. 
 49. For the Abolition of Saturday-Night and Sunday Work, supra note 47. See also Non-Union 
Bakeries, BAKER’S J., Aug. 19, 1905, at 1 (“[W]e also wish to call your attention to the fact that all 
French and Italian bread is non-union. All of your efforts to unionize their bakers have been so far in 
vain, having met with the severest opposition by both employers and employees.”).  
 50. Brenner, supra note 43, at 63. 
 51. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 39, at 195 (stating that the union “entirely ignored” English-
speaking bakers); Anything Needed, BAKER’S J., Apr. 26, 1896, at 1 (noting the relative absence of 
English-speakers in the union); The English Speaking Bakers, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1893, at 1. 
 52. SCHNEIDER, supra note 39, at 205. 
 53. KENS, supra note 35, at 47–48. 
 54. See Frank H. Brooks, Ideology, Strategy, And Organization: Dyer Lum and the American 
Anarchist Movement, 34 LAB. HIST. 57 (1993); Editorial, LIBERTY, Jan. 1899, at 5. 
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union’s unofficial leader and spokesperson and led a new campaign for a 
ten-hour law in New York.55 
While the bakers’ union focused on lobbying for a ten-hour law, others 
grew concerned with the sanitary conditions in basement bakeries, and the 
effects those conditions could have on both the public health and the 
health of bakers. In 1894, a dying Jewish baker was carried from a cellar 
bakery on the Lower East Side. Weismann publicized the incident, and 
demanded an investigation into the health and sanitary conditions in cellar 
bakeries in Brooklyn and Manhattan.56 Weismann persuaded the New York 
Press to send a team of reporters—accompanied by union bakers who 
were familiar with the worst bakeries—to investigate.57 The result was an 
exposé by muckraking reporter Edward Marshall detailing unsanitary 
conditions in bakeries, as well as poor working conditions, and calling for 
legislative intervention.58 
As with Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, a famous muckraking work on 
the meatpacking industry, the public was more interested in sanitary 
conditions that could impact their health than in working conditions. 
Marshall’s story included tales of cockroaches on the walls and on baking 
utensils, flour mixed in a tub that had been used to wash a sick child’s 
clothes, and graphic illustrations of other unsanitary conditions.59 The 
specifics of Marshall’s reporting—or at least how representative his 
findings were of cellar bakeries in general—are a bit suspect, because he 
was known for his reformist sympathies, his article was researched at the 
urging and with the cooperation of Weismann, and the piece was timed to 
coincide with the bakers’ union’s campaign for a ten-hour law.60 
Nevertheless, the gist of Marshall’s article is supported by a state 
factory inspectors’ report issued two years later, based on inspections 
conducted in 1895.61 The inspectors found “[l]eaky pipes, open sewers, 
filthy closets and untrapped sinks.” They ordered the removal of hundreds 
 55. KENS, supra note 35, at 47–48. 
 56. Brenner, supra note 43, at 64–65.  
 57. Edward Marshall, Bread and Filth Cooked Together, N.Y. PRESS, Sept. 30 1894, § 4, at 1. 
 58. KENS, supra note 35, at 50–51. Similar stories were published in the New York Recorder at 
the urging of the English-speaking New York Local 80. KAUFMAN, supra note 38. 
 59. Marshall, supra note 57. 
 60. The union’s primary interest was in limiting working hours, a provision that could be 
piggybacked on to a sanitary law. But the union also supported the regulation or closure of basement 
bakeries. See The English Speaking Bakers, supra note 51; The Movement for Sanitary Bakeshops, 
BAKER’S J., Mar. 23, 1895, at 1. Marshall later spoke at a rally in favor of union-sponsored legislation, 
and promised to aid the union in this matter in any way he could. See Brilliant and Imposing 
Demonstration of the Journeyman Bakers of New York, BAKER’S J., May 25, 1895, at 1. 
 61. For a contemporaneous report on the ongoing inspections, see Inspecting Bakeries in the 
State, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1895, at 6. 
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of water closets, often in disgusting condition, from their locations in bake 
rooms or rooms contiguous to bake rooms.62 The worst conditions for 
bakers were found in the stuffy and unventilated tenement basement 
bakeries in Manhattan and Brooklyn.63 Moreover, the sanitary conditions 
in those bakeries threatened the public health: 
Cockroaches and other insects, some of them the peculiar 
development of foul bakeries and never seen elsewhere, abounded, 
and as chance willed became part of the salable products. Rats, 
which seemed not to fear the human denizens of these catacombs, 
ran back and forth between the piled up bread and their holes.64 
The inspectors added that the bakers who lived in their bakeries (forty-
six percent of them)65 “hardly ever get out of their baking clothes, that 
they, as well as their bedding, are in a nauseatingly filthy condition, totally 
unfitted to serve as chief factors in the production of the staff of life.”66 
In any event, the attention garnered by Marshall’s article led to public 
calls for a bakery reform law. A proposed act consisting of a series of 
sanitary reforms for “biscuit, bread, and cake factories” was introduced in 
the legislature, and gathered the support of many leading reformers, 
 62. FACTORY INSPECTORS’ REPORT, supra note 42, at 45. 
 63. Id. at 46. 
 64. Id. 
 65. The Statistics of the Journeymen Bakers of the State of New York, VII, BAKER’S J., Aug. 12, 
1896, at 1. 
 66. Id. at 56. On the other hand, in May 1896 Dr. Charles G. Purdy inspected Brooklyn bakeries 
and wrote the following in a report to Z. Taylor Emery, the Brooklyn Commissioner of Health:  
The people who are so anxious to have special bake shop laws passed are evidently inspired 
by something else that their desire to advance the public welfare. They make loud complaint 
to the effect that the bakeries occupy cellars, that chickens are kept in them, that swarms of 
vermin are generally to be found, that the atmosphere is unhealthy, that the hours of labor are 
too long and that hundreds of men sleep on the floor. All of this I find to be greatly 
exaggerated and most of it absolutely false.  
The Bakeries Are All Right, BROOKLYN EAGLE, May 12, 1896, at 4. Purdy added that he inspected one 
of the bakeries described by Marshall as “filthy in the extreme and overrun with vermin” and was 
unable to “find even a water bug.” Id. One of the bakery employees told him that when Marshall 
visited, there were no vermin in the bakery. Id. Purdy also claimed that public health concerns about 
bakery products were misplaced, because the high heat involved in the baking process rendered all 
bake shop products sterile when they left the ovens. Id.  
 Weismann responded that the Brooklyn health board was under the influence of the “cellar 
bakers,” and attempted to rebut Purdy’s conclusions with specific examples of unsanitary bakeries and 
with scientific authorities stating that baking does not destroy all “microorganisms.” A Sharp Reply to 
Dr. Purdy, BROOKLYN EAGLE, May 14, 1896, at 14. 
 Overall, Purdy’s report does not seem credible. A Brooklyn Eagle reporter visited twelve small 
bakeshops in February 1896 and found two of them so thick with roaches that “one of the bakers said 
he never dared to go to sleep in the cellar.” Big Bakers Back Audett, BROOKLYN EAGLE, Feb. 23, 1896, 
at 22. The reporter also found that sleeping in the “small shops is a common thing for the bakers.” Id. 
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including American Federation of Labor president Samuel Gompers, 
philanthropist and founder of the Ethical Culture Society Felix Adler, 
prominent Episcopal pastor Rev. William Rainsford, and Civil War hero 
and prominent German-American General Franz Sigel.67 Prejudice against 
certain immigrant groups likely also contributed to support for the law, as 
the following comment from a factory inspector’s report suggests: “it is 
almost impossible to secure or keep in proper cleanly condition the Jewish 
and Italian bakeshops. Cleanliness and tidiness are entirely foreign to these 
people, and their bakeshops are like their sweatshops, for like causes 
produce like effects.”68 
The Bakeshop Act, as it came to be known, was modeled on England’s 
Bakehouse Regulation Act of 1863.69 The sanitary provisions in the 
proposed New York law were similar to those in the English law, but the 
New York proposal included a maximum hours provision—tacked on at 
the urging of the bakers’ union—that limited biscuit, cake, and bread 
bakers’ hours of labor to ten per day and sixty per week.70 The hours 
provision received an important endorsement from state Health 
Commissioner Cyrus Edson, who wrote, “The provision limiting the hours 
of worktime of the men is especially good from a sanitary standpoint. 
There is unmistakable evidence that these men are overworked, and that, 
in consequence of this, they are sickly and unfit to handle an article of 
food.”71 
Not surprisingly, the Bakeshop Act also received the strong support of 
the bakers’ union. The union’s official rationale for supporting the Act 
was that it was “a sanitary measure solely” and therefore “will stand the 
closest scruting of constitutional lawyers and the courts.”72 However, the 
union also believed that the Act, especially its hours provision, would 
benefit its members for reasons beyond improved sanitary conditions. An 
editorial in the same issue of the Baker’s Journal promised that the ten-
hour workday would solve all of the problems faced by (unionized) 
bakers, including “[t]he lack of work, increased numbers of apprentices, 
cheap labor, insane competition among employers, [and] the era of 3-cents 
 67. The Bakers’ Bill Progressing, BAKER’S J., Mar. 30, 1895, at 1. 
 68. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF FACTORY INSPECTOR OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK, quoted in Bakeshop Inspection, BAKER’S J., Aug. 1, 1898, at 19, 20 [hereinafter TWELFTH 
ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 69. See People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 382 (N.Y. 1904). 
 70. Id. See also KENS, supra note 35, at 44–59. 
 71. The Bakers’ Bill Progressing, supra note 67. 
 72. The Bakers’ Bill to be Signed by Governor Morton, BAKER’S J., Apr. 20, 1895, at 2.  
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loaves of bread.”73 “The weapon of a timely and popular law is about to be 
placed into our hands,” the editorial continued, “Will the journeymen 
bakers of New York use it?”74 
As submitted to the New York legislature, the first section of the 
Bakeshop Act contained the hours provision. The next three sections 
contained various sanitary regulations, such as prohibiting domestic 
animals in bakeries and prohibiting workers from sleeping in a bake room. 
The final two provisions provided for enforcement by the state factory 
inspector.75 The Bakeshop Act passed unanimously in both houses of the 
legislature.76 At the last minute, the bill was amended to prohibit only 
employees from working more than ten hours a day; employers were 
permitted to work as many hours as they saw fit.77 This change was made 
to aid owners of small bakeries, some of whom were sole proprietors. It 
was supported by the bakers’ union because, as Weismann wrote, “our aim 
[is] principally to protect the employee.”78 That change was approved 
unanimously by both houses, and Governor Levi P. Morton signed the Act 
into law on May 2, 1895.79 Weismann wrote in the Bakers’ Journal that 
this day “will stand forth as one of the most memorable days in the history 
of the great struggle of American bakers for better and more humane 
conditions.”80 A year later, the law was amended to effectively close down 
certain basement bakeries, prohibit the establishment of new ones, and 
establish whistleblower protection for employees.81 
A mystery in the history of Lochner has been how the Bakeshop Act 
managed to gain unanimous support. Several factors appear to have been 
at work. Bakery owners were not politically organized at this time, while 
the bakers’ union was well-represented in Albany.82 To the extent the 
bakery owners did have political clout, it was divided between the owners 
of large bakeshops and smaller, but relatively well-established (and 
predominantly German-owned) bakeshops. These groups shared an 
 73. Now for the Ten-Hour Day, supra note 34. 
 74. Id. 
 75. N.Y. Laws ch. 415 § 110–115 (1897). 
 76. Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Rehabilitated and Revised, But Still Reviled, 1995 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 31, 34. See also KENS, supra note 35, at 59. 
 77. The Baker’s Bill to be Signed by Governor Morton, supra note 72. 
 78. Id. 
 79. BAKER’S J., May 11, 1895, at 11. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The Amendments to the Baking Inspection Law of New York, BAKER’S J., Jan. 22, 1896, at 1 
(reviewing the provisions). 
 82. National Association of Master Bakers, BAKERS’ REV., Sept. 15, 1903, at 31, 39 (“The labor 
union has twenty-five men to lobby . . . the master bakers not one.”). 
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interest in driving the bakeshops owned by recent Jewish, Italian, and 
French immigrants—bakeshops that tended to have the worst sanitary and 
working conditions—out of business. Moreover, the sanitary provisions of 
the law would improve the reputation and thus the profit potential of the 
baking industry, which competed with home-baked goods.83 Many of the 
dominant German-owned bakeries already adhered to a ten-hour day, or 
close to it,84 and were more than content to have that standard imposed on 
their competitors.85 Owners of large Brooklyn bakeries were “heartily in 
favor” of bakeshop legislation, and some explicitly lobbied in favor of 
amendments to strengthen the law.86 
Progress in enforcing the New York Bakeshop Act was slow.87 State 
factory inspectors found that many small tenement basement bakeries 
 83. See A Voice in Favor of Bake Shop Laws in the Interest of the Baking Industry, BAKER’S J., 
June 15 1895, at 3 (quoting the Baker’s Helper, a trade magazine, as favoring bakeshop legislation like 
the New York law because sanitary laws would increase the consumption of bakery bread). 
 84. Big Bakers Back Audett, BROOKLYN EAGLE, Feb. 23, 1896, at 22 (“The men who conduct the 
large establishments are heartily in favor of the [amended bakeshop bill] claiming that they are already 
conforming with all its requirements and can see no good reason why the owners of the small bake 
shops should not do the same”). See also The Ten-Hour Decision, BAKERS REV., May 15, 1905, at 33 
(“Even with the laughable pretense of the unhealthfullness of the baking trade, the measure would 
have been accepted by the master bakers, who had long before realized that a ten-hour workday was 
entirely sufficient. . .”). According to the Baker’s Journal, before the law was passed, less than twenty 
percent of bakers worked sixty hours weekly or less, but another twenty-five percent worked between 
sixty-one and seventy hours. The Statistics of the Journeyman Bakers of the State of New York, 
BAKER’S J., June 3, 1896, at 1. According to a New York Factory Inspectors’ report, and an article in 
the Brooklyn Eagle, most bakers working in large bakeries worked sixty hours or less. FACTORY 
INSPECTORS’ REPORT, supra note 42; Employees Alone Benefited, supra note 42.  
 85. BAKERS REV., June 1, 1905, at 31 (“In New York City and other places in the country the 
Hebrew journeymen bakers went on strike against the master bakers of their faith to gain the ten-hour 
day, having been compelled to work twelve and fourteen hours a day regularly; we are glad to state in 
all cases of such a nature the journeymen have won.”); The Ten-Hour Decision, supra note 84, at 33, 
38 (“The master bakers do not object to the ten-hour day; they do not intend to compel their employees 
to work fourteen or sixteen hours, as has been intimated by so-called labor leaders.”); The Strike 
Situation, BAKERS REV., June 1905, at 33 (“Similar to their co-religionists in New York, the Hebrew 
journeymen bakers of Baltimore, Md., have gone on strike to enforce the ten-hour workday. They are 
tired of working twelve or fourteen hours a day. We cannot blame them and hope they will be 
completely successful.”). The owner of a large bakeshop denied that wholesale bakers lobbied for the 
law. See Employees Alone Benefited, supra note 42. 
 86. See Big Bakers Back Audett, supra note 68; see also FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MASTER BAKERS [Souvenir Program] 94–95 (1901) (explaining that one 
of the first acts of the Master Bakers’ Association was to endorse “sanitary laws relating to bakeries”). 
 87. See Brenner, supra note 43, at 68 (noting that only eight arrests were made in New York City 
in 1896, despite widespread flouting of the law); Our Protective Law—How to Use It, BAKER’S J., 
Sept. 1, 1897, at 53, 54 (“The enforcement of the 60-hours provision . . . is the most difficult of all, 
because the journeymen can in very few cases be had to testify against their employers as long as they 
work for them”); Wages and Hours of Labor of the Journeymen Bakers of New York State, BAKER’S J., 
Oct. 1, 1898, at 84 (“After three years’ operation of the ten-hour law for the bakeries, there is every 
reason to believe that the hours of labor of the journeymen bakers have not in the least been influenced 
by it.”). 
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ignored both the sanitary provisions and the hours provisions of the law. 
The inspectors received many anonymous complaints about working hours 
in basement bakeries, but few workers were willing to sign affidavits that 
they had been asked to work more hours than the law allowed. Because in 
many instances the bakery was not only the employees’ workplace, but 
also where they lived, a vengeful employer might not only fire them, but 
evict them as well.88 In the early years, at least, most complaints for 
violations of the Bakeshop Act were filed by competitors, not employees, 
of the offending bakeries.89 Some employees, likely those whose 
employers’ livelihoods were threatened by enforcement of the sixty-hour 
law, not only refused to cooperate in enforcing the law, but actually helped 
their employers evade the law.90 The inspectors recommended that the 
Bakeshop Act be amended to abolish basement bakeries entirely, as that 
was the only way that the abuses targeted by the Bakeshop Act would ever 
be ended.91 The bakers’ union also called for a ban on basement bakeries.92 
Attempts to pass such legislation failed, as did attempts by a coalition of 
owners of small bakeries, tenement house landlords, and flour dealers to 
weaken the original law.93 
Meanwhile, the executive committee of the bakers’ union, pleased by 
Weismann’s success in promoting the Bakeshop Act, had elected him to 
the union’s highest office, international secretary.94 Weismann, however, 
resigned in 1897 amid allegations that he had received kickbacks from the 
company that printed the Bakers’ Journal and had embezzled advertising 
money.95 Weismann soon opened a bakery of his own, while studying law 
and passing the New York bar exam.96 He also became active in both 
Republican politics97 and the New York Association of Master Bakers, 
 88. FACTORY INSPECTORS’ REPORT, supra note 42, at 43, 46. 
 89. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 19, 20. But see Henry Weismann, Letter to the 
Editor, Inspections of Bakeries, BROOKLYN EAGLE, May 21, 1896, at 8 (claiming that he knows of 
several instances in which bakers lost their jobs after reporting violations of the Bakeshop Act). 
 90. Dennis J. Hanlon, The Work of Factory Inspection, BAKER’S J., Sept. 15, 1897, at 65. 
 91. Id. at 47. 
 92. Complaints of the Bakers, supra note 44.  
 93. KENS, supra note 35, at 60–61; The New York Boss Bakers’ Bill Dead, BAKER’S J., Apr. 15, 
1898, at 292; To Pillory With the Rascals, BAKER’S J., Apr. 1, 1898, at 276. Among other things, the 
bill would have exempted “foremen and other subordinates” from the law, and would have required 
the inspection of groceries and other stores that sold bread, thus diverting resources from the 
inspection of small bakeshops, and imposing costs on groceries that bought bread almost exclusively 
from large “factory bakeries.” Id. 
 94. KENS, supra note 35, at 98.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Made the 10-Hour Law, Then Had it Unmade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1904, at 5.  
 97. Editorial, LIBERTY, Jan. 1899, at 5. 
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which represented primarily small, New York bakeshop owners of 
German descent,98 and came to oppose the ten-hour law. Weismann later 
wrote that as a master baker, he underwent “an intellectual revolution, saw 
where the law which I had succeeded in having passed was unjust to the 
employers.”99 
Over time, opposition to the ten-hour provision of the law among 
bakeshop owners grew. The newly organized New York Association of 
Master Bakers claimed that the bakers’ union was using the law as a 
bludgeon to attack nonunion bakeshops. The Bakers Review, the 
Association’s publication, consistently noted “that there are occasions 
when overtime work in a bakery is an absolute necessity.”100 The bakers’ 
union, in fact, recognized this reality; despite the ten-hour law’s ban on 
overtime work, union contracts proposed and signed after the law’s 
passage provided for overtime work for additional pay.101 
According to the Bakers Review, the union nevertheless used the ten-
hour provision to its advantage by threatening bakery owners who refused 
to sign union contracts with prosecution. Moreover, a disgruntled 
employee or former employee could also use the law to take revenge 
against a bakery owner.102 Because all bakeshops occasionally needed 
 98. See Two Master Bakers’ Conventions, BAKER’S J., Oct. 12, 1901, at 4 (discussing a 
convention of owners of small bakeries, including representatives of the New York Master Bakers’ 
Association, at which opposition to bakeshop laws was voiced, and noting the existence of a separate 
organization of owners of large bakeries); Why All This Quarrel?, BAKER’S J., Nov. 2, 1901, at 1 
(referring to the convention of owners of bakeries and their opposition to New York’s ten-hour law). 
At a banquet celebrating the Association’s victory in Lochner, the treasurer of the association gave an 
address mostly in German. Celebration of Victory, BAKERS REV., June 1905, at 41, 42. 
 99. Henry Weismann, BAKER’S J., May 27, 1905, at 1; see also The Traitors at Their Dirty Work 
in the Country Towns, BAKER’S J., Apr. 1, 1898, at 5. 
 100. The Ten-Hour Decision, supra note 84, at 33; National Association of Master Bakers, supra 
note 82, at 39 (“sometimes the exigencies of his employer’s business are such as to require overtime 
work, in which case it is preposterous to consider it a criminal offense”); The Ten-Hour Law, BAKERS 
REV., Feb. 15, 1904, at 31 (“In the bakery trade as in any other trade there are occasions when it is 
impossible to avoid working a little overtime. . .”). 
 101. The Ten-Hour Decision, supra note 84, at 33; National Association of Master Bakers, supra 
note 82, at 39 (“The inconsistency of this law is shown by the contracts of the union, which name a 
scale of wage for overtime work.”); Celebration of Victory, supra note 98 (“The journeymen 
themselves, who opposed our efforts to have the law set aside, in submitting to you contracts for two 
more hours’ overtime when necessary, regard the law in the aforesaid sense to be arbitrary, and, in a 
business such as baking, to be inoperative, and yet they have consistently opposed every attempt at a 
change.”). At least one such agreement was reported in the Baker’s Journal. See More Agreements, 
BAKER’S J., Apr. 15, 1902, at 1 (mentioning a Buffalo agreement that provided for overtime). New 
Jersey’s bakeshop law, passed in 1896, also had a sixty-hours rule, but had a provision allowing for 
two hours daily of emergency overtime for extra pay. New Jersey, BAKER’S J., Apr. 22, 1896, at 1. 
 102. The Ten-Hour Law, supra note 100, at 31 (“It makes no difference whether the master baker 
is willing to pay extra for the extra time worked, and the journeyman willing to perform the task; is 
that particular master baker has a scoundrel among his workmen or has ever made any journeyman 
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their employees to work overtime, all bakery owners were subject to this 
“blackmail.”103 The Bakers Review expressed its opposition to the law as 
follows:  
We can not state it here too plainly that the master bakers are not 
opposed to limiting the hours of work in their bakeshops to sixty 
hours per week. They are entirely willing to conform with the law in 
that respect, though they can not see why the matter of settling 
hours of work should not be left to employers and employees in the 
baking trade, in the same way as it has to be settled in any other 
trade. But the master bakers strongly protest to be made the victims 
of the blackguards.104 
Weisman later stated: “I’ve been personally identified to some extent with 
the enactment of the law . . . no one, at the time, thought that the act would 
be employed as a means of black mail exclusively, and as in force and 
where ever attempted would prove that is impossible in its application to 
the bakery business.”105 
At its 1901 and 1902 conventions, the New York Master Bakers 
Association resolved to find an appropriate test case, and challenge the 
ten-hour provision all the way to the Supreme Court.106 Advocates of the 
challenge overcame the opposition of supporters of the ten-hour 
provision107—likely those who owned large wholesale bakeries where 
overtime work was relatively rare, the ten-hour day standard, and 
unionization common.108 
feel bitter toward him, his dollars to donuts that some such miscreant will inform on him and he will 
have to pay the fine or go to jail.”). 
 103. The Ten-Hour Decision, supra note 84, at 33; National Association of Master Bakers, supra 
note 82, at 39 (“the door for the blackmailers among the journeymen now stands ajar, and no boss 
baker who by insuperable conditions now and then is obliged to permit his men to work over ten hour, 
and against the malicious charge of a discontented or discharged journeyman, that he violated the ten-
hour law”); The Ten-Hour Law, supra note 100 (“To speak plainly about it, this whole overtime-
prohibiting-business is a blackmailing scheme, pure and simple . . . .”). 
 104. The Ten-Hour Law, supra note 100 (noting the relative rarity of overtime work in large 
wholesale bakeries). 
 105. Quoted in Celebration of Victory, supra note 98. The view of the Master Bakers is perhaps 
supported by the fact that one of the four factory inspectors appointed to enforce the law was Dennis 
Hanlon, president of bakers’ union Local 80. KAUFMAN, supra note 38, at 32. 
 106. The Ten-Hour Law, supra note 100. 
 107. The Ten-Hour Decision, supra note 84. 
 108. The Ten-Hour Law, supra note 100, at 31 (noting the relative rarity of overtime work in large 
wholesale bakeries); see also KAUFMAN, supra note 38, at 50 (explaining that the owners of large 
modern bakeries supported enforcement of the Bakeshop Act from the beginning, and that workers in 
such bakeries worked in ten-hour shifts). 
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B. The Legal Background 
The Association soon found such an appropriate case, involving the 
prosecution of Utica baker Joseph Lochner for violating the ten-hour law. 
Lochner emigrated from Bavaria at age twenty in 1882, and worked for 
eight years in a bakery in Utica, New York, before opening a bakeshop of 
his own in that city.109 Lochner consistently refused to sign a union 
contract.110 The union therefore reported him to the Factory Inspector for 
violating the ten-hour provision of the Bakeshop Act law, apparently when 
he permitted an employee to work extra hours to learn cakemaking.111 He 
was prosecuted and fined twenty-five dollars.112  
In April 1902, Lochner was again arrested. He had allegedly employed 
a worker named Aman Schmitter for more than sixty hours in one week. 
The union once again persuaded the factory inspectors to file a complaint 
against him.113  
The Utica Master Bakers Association, of which Lochner was a 
member, appealed to the State Association to take up his defense and 
challenge the law, which it agreed to.114 A grand jury indicted Lochner in 
October. At a pretrial hearing, his attorney, William S. Mackie, of local 
law firm Lindsley & Mackie, unsuccessfully requested dismissal on 
technicalities. At trial in February 1903, Lochner refused to plead guilt or 
innocence, and offered no defense, assumedly to allow the case to proceed 
as a test case. The court found Lochner guilty, and he was sentenced to 
pay a fifty dollar fine or spend fifty days in jail.115 
The Master Bakers Association had some reason to hope for a positive 
outcome to its legal challenge. State courts had invalidated labor 
legislation under two theories. First, courts closely scrutinized legislative 
classifications to ensure that they were reasonable and had a valid public 
purpose. If the court found that a classification was unreasonable or 
arbitrary, the underlying legislation constituted “class legislation,” 
 109. Hadley Arkes, Lochner v. New York and the Cast of Our Laws, in GREAT CASES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94, 104 (Robert P. George ed., 2000). 
 110. Note, Bakery Law of New York Unconstitutional, 39 AM. L. REV. 450, 450 (1905); The Ten-
Hour Decision, supra note 84, at 33. 
 111. Note, supra note 110. 
 112. Id.; Decision Given in Labor Case, UTICA HERALD DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 1905, at 2; Morris 
Hillquit, The Decision of the United States Supreme Court on the Ten-Hour Law for Employees of 
Bakeries—The Passage and Provisions of the Law, BAKER’S J., May 13, 1905, at 1. 
 113. KENS, supra note 35, at 79. 
 114. The Ten-Hour Decision, supra note 84. 
 115. KENS, supra note 35, at 80–81. 
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legislation that illegitimately favored or disfavored particular groups.116 
Opposition to class legislation had been a constant in American politics 
since at least the Jacksonian era, and arguably since the Founding.117 After 
the Civil War, courts gradually concluded that class legislation was 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause and state equivalents.118 
Regulatory laws that applied only to certain industries, like the hours 
provision of the Bakeshop Act, were especially vulnerable to the charge of 
class legislation,119 although the outcome to challenges to various 
regulations very much depended on the jurisdiction in which the 
challenges were brought. The many state decisions invalidating laws on 
class legislation grounds led treatise writer Ernst Freund to conclude in 
1904 that the ban on unequal laws is “one of the most effectual limitations 
upon the exercise of the police power,” the states’ power to regulate on 
behalf of the health, safety, and welfare of the public.120 The impact on 
protective labor legislation was particularly stark—the prohibition on class 
legislation was seen as the greatest constitutional barrier to regulation of 
the labor market. 
Another strand of state constitutional case law suggested that any 
regulation of contractual relations that lacked a valid police power 
rationale was arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional.121 
The right to be free from arbitrary or unreasonable regulation had deep 
roots in Anglo-American natural rights thinking. The only question was 
whether judges had the constitutional authority to enforce this right. While 
objections to labor legislation as class legislation were mainly addressed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, postbellum 
judges located the constitutional source of the more general right to be free 
from arbitrary or unreasonable regulations in the Due Process clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and state constitutions.122 Courts were 
especially vigilant in their review of labor regulations, which they saw as 
potentially violating the fundamental right to “free labor,” a right that had 
been an explicit ideological basis of the Civil War. Several courts 
consistently rejected state claims that novel labor regulations had valid 
 116. See generally GILLMAN, supra note 27. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 19. 
 120. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 682, 
at 705 (1904). 
 121. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 19. 
 122. Id. 
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police power purposes, but other courts were more willing to defer to the 
legislature.123 
The New York Court of Appeals had issued some of the leading 
opinions invalidating regulations, especially regulations that the court saw 
as interfering with the right to pursue an occupation. Most famously, in 
1885 the court invalidated a law banning cigar manufacturing in tenement 
apartments as a violation of due process rights.124 Even more propitious 
for Lochner was a 1901 decision invalidating a requirement that state 
contractors pay their workers the “prevailing wage.”125 In that case, the 
Court of Appeals explicitly endorsed a wide range of state court decisions 
invalidating various types of “paternal” labor regulations that were found 
to have no valid health or safety rationale. On the other hand, the Court of 
Appeals had also issued several opinions upholding regulations, including 
labor regulations, as within New York’s police power.126 
Armed with at least some favorable class legislation and due process 
precedents, Lochner appealed to a New York Appellate Division court. 
The court split 3-2 in favor of upholding the hours law.127 Judge John M. 
Davy wrote the rather cryptic majority opinion. Davy stated that the hours 
law was a valid police power measure, with the goal of improving public 
health. He found that the law was not class legislation because it was 
“directed to all persons engaged in the bakery business” and “neither 
confers special privileges, nor makes unjust discrimination.”128 Davy 
added that the hours law did not infringe on the fundamental right to 
pursue an occupation because it was not prohibitory, but merely 
regulatory.129 
Lochner appealed the Appellate Division’s decision to the Court of 
Appeals.130 He lost once again, this time in a 4-3 decision. Chief Judge 
Alton B. Parker wrote the majority opinion. Parker stated that it was 
“beyond question” that the public had an interest in having clean 
bakeries.131 Therefore, it was within the power of the legislature to 
 123. See id. 
 124. See In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (N.Y. 1885). 
 125. People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 59 N.E. 716 (N.Y. 1901). 
 126. See generally Felice Batlan, A Reevaluation of the New York Court of Appeals: The Home, 
the Market, and Labor, 1885–1905, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 489 (2002) (reviewing New York Court 
of Appeals decisions and concluding that it was far less of a “laissez-faire” court than many have 
presumed). 
 127. People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902). 
 128. Id. at 401–02. 
 129. Id. at 401. 
 130. See People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373 (N.Y. 1904). 
 131. Id. at 379. 
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regulate the conduct of business so as to provide for and protect the health 
of people. Parker added that the Bakeshop Act as a whole was clearly 
intended to promote public health, with the hours provision a part of the 
overall plan to improve bakery sanitation. After all, Parker contended, a 
worker would be more likely to be careful and clean when not overworked 
than when exhausted with fatigue. Even assuming arguendo that the 
statute was not meant to protect public health, Parker continued, the law 
still operated to protect the health of bakers and was therefore within the 
police power.132 
Judge John Clinton Gray wrote a concurring opinion. While Gray 
believed that the sixty-hour workweek restriction might be invalid as an 
infringement of liberty of contract if considered alone, when read in pari 
materia with the rest of the Bakeshop Act its connection to health 
regulation was plain. Gray emphasized that the only appropriate rationale 
for upholding the law was that it protected public health and not just the 
health of bakers.133 
Judge Irving Vann also concurred. He stated that the hours law could 
be upheld only if “from common knowledge” the court could say that 
working in a bakery was unhealthful.134 Vann stated that in resolving that 
factual issue, the court “may resort to such sources of information as were 
open to the legislature.”135 He then quoted books and articles discussing 
the negative effect of flour and sugar particles and excess heat on bakers, 
which purportedly left bakers vulnerable to consumption. He also cited 
statistics showing a higher mortality rate for bakers than for other 
industrial workers. Exactly where Vann came across these data is not 
clear; none of the studies he cites were mentioned in either party’s brief. 
Vann found that the evidence “leads to the conclusion that the occupation 
of a baker or confectioner is unhealth[ful], and tends to result in disease of 
the respiratory organs.”136 
Judge Denis O’Brien dissented. He argued that the hours provision was 
unduly paternal, and therefore illicitly infringed on the liberty and property 
rights of citizens. O’Brien also contended that the hours provision was 
class legislation that discriminated in favor of one person against another, 
as it applied only to a very small class of bakers and confectioners, but not 
 132. Id. at 379–81. 
 133. Id. at 381 (Gray, J., concurring). 
 134. Id. at 382 (Vann, J., concurring). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 382–84. 
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other occupations.137 O’Brien conceded that the hours provision would 
still be valid if it were a legitimate exercise of police power, but he 
contended that the hours provision could not be so construed because it 
was “quite impossible to conceive” its relation to the production of 
healthful bread.138 
Moreover, O’Brien claimed the hours provision could not be justified 
as a measure aimed at protecting the health of bakers. Baking was not 
known to be unhealthful, O’Brien wrote, and the law allowed self-
employed bakers to work as many hours as they wished, providing further 
evidence that the hours provision was a “labor law,” not a health law.139 
O’Brien also pointed out the hours provision was codified in the Labor 
section and not the Health section of the New York Code.140 Dissenting 
judge Edward Bartlett echoed O’Brien’s contention that there was no 
evidence that baking was unhealthful. He found the hours provision to be 
“paternal[istic]” and argued that it should be invalidated.141 
Union supporters were pleased with the victory, but were unhappy with 
how close and difficult the case was. For example, the South Dakota 
Herald proclaimed,  
What a Victory! This has become the richest country on earth, and 
we boast of being the most civilized, and yet with all our wealth, 
with all our civilization, ten hours is now hailed by the toilers as a 
shortened workday. Why, eighteen years ago the organized workers 
of this country were agitating for an eight hour work day.142 
Meanwhile, the New York Association of Master Bakers met in 
February 1904 and decided to levy an assessment of one dollar on each 
member to pay for an appeal of the case to the Supreme Court.143 Attorney 
Mackie declined to continue to represent the Master Bakers; he informed 
the organization that its planned Supreme Court appeal was hopeless, and 
stated that the Association should not waste its money.144 The Executive 
Committee of the Association then considered a list of names, and settled 
on Henry Weismann, who was thought to be “not only an able barrister, 
 137. Id. at 385–87 (O’Brien, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 387. 
 139. Id. at 388. 
 140. Id. at 387–89. 
 141. Id. at 389 (Bartlett, J., dissenting). 
 142. Opinion of Others, BAKER’S J., Feb. 27, 1904, at 1 (quoting the South Dakota Herald). 
 143. Down With Ten-Hour-Law! Is the War-Cry of the Boss Bakers, BAKER’S J., Feb. 27, 1904, at 
1. 
 144. Celebration of Victory, supra note 98. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1469 Bernstein book pages.doc5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1492 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1469 
 
 
 
 
 
 
but had been, in his early career, a practical baker, [and] to possess 
absolute knowledge of existing conditions, instead of abstract theories.”145 
Weismann was teamed with prominent Brooklyn attorney Frank Harvey 
Field.146  
Weismann told the New York Times that while he understood 
opposition to a system that required bakers to be on call at all hours for a 
daily salary, the hours provision unreasonably prohibited bakers from 
working a standard ten-hour day and then being paid a double wage for 
overtime.147 The Bakers’ Journal, in contrast, stated: 
Every time the boss bakers appeal to have the ten-hour law declared 
unconstitutional, they show themselves in a stronger light as the 
most bitter and irreconcilable enemies of every improvement of the 
condition of the worker, they show themselves as brutal exploiters 
without conscience, who do not care a continental for the existence 
of a happy life of the families of their employees. They show 
themselves in their true light as men who would sooner sacrifice the 
health and life of thousands of workingmen than to comply at least 
with the smallest demands of the workers.148 
With regard to the Master Bakers’ appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
Journal stated: “[W]e have no reason at all to become excited on account 
of an eventual appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.”149 The 
opinion of Judge Parker, the Journal editorialized, “provides indelible 
evidence that conditions exist in the bakery trade which undermine the 
health of the bakery workers and absorb their intellectual and physical 
powers.”150 
C. The Supreme Court Case 
With Lochner’s appeal pending before the Supreme Court, the New 
York Association of Master Bakers hedged its bet by having its legislative 
representative promote a bill that would amend the ten-hour provision of 
the Bakeshop Act to permit overtime.151 Meanwhile, the State Factory 
Inspector purportedly had a list, comprising more than half the master 
 145. Id. 
 146. Made the 10-Hour Law, Then Had it Unmade, supra note 96. 
 147. Master Bakers Keep Up Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1904, at 5. 
 148. Boss Bakers Will Appeal Again, BAKER’S J., Feb. 20, 1904, at 1. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Association News: New York State Association, BAKERS REV., Mar. 15, 1905, at 45. 
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bakers in New York, of master bakers who had violated the ten-hour 
provision.152 If the law was held to be constitutional, he would commence 
action against them. 
The prospects for Lochner’s appeal did not seem promising. The 
Supreme Court had acknowledged that illicit class legislation violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but had a very narrow 
conception of what constituted illicit class legislation.153 Lochner could 
take some comfort from the fact that the Court had recently invalidated 
several laws applying only to certain industries as blatant class 
legislation.154 However, the Court had consistently upheld laws regulating 
labor relations, most prominently in Holden v. Hardy,155 in which the 
Court upheld a maximum hours law that applied only to underground 
miners. Over the next several years, the Court upheld three additional 
labor statutes challenged as class legislation, with the dissenters never 
getting more than three votes.156  
A class legislation/equal protection claim was thus a longshot, as was 
the other possible ground for Lochner’s appeal—that the hours provision 
of the Bakeshop Act violated the right of Lochner and his workers to 
“liberty of contract.”157 True, the Court was growing increasingly 
aggressive in its due process jurisprudence;158 in 1898, for example, it 
invalidated a confiscatory state utility price regulation as a violation of the 
Due Process Clause’s protection of property rights.159 And the Court had 
recently recognized in dicta that liberty of contract was a fundamental 
right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.160 However, by the time of Lochner’s appeal, the Court had 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 19. 
 154. E.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902). 
 155. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 156. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903); St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 
207 (1902); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901). 
 157. Perhaps the first scholarly treatment of the subject was Frederick N. Judson, Liberty of 
Contract Under the Police Power, 25 AM. L. REV. 871 (1891). 
 158. See Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process, 45 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 71 (2001). 
 159. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). Smyth was the leading precedent in a separate line of 
Lochner era due process cases from the line discussed in this Article. The Smyth cases reviewed state 
rate regulation to ensure that it didn’t “take from A to give to B.” Unlike the Lochner line of cases, 
these cases primarily focused on the property, and not liberty, protections of the Due Process Clause. 
 160. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351 (1904); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 
169, 173–75 (1903); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 572–73 (1898); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
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consistently refused to invalidate purported police power regulations of 
labor as violations of liberty of contract.161 
Faced with limited and unattractive options, Lochner attorneys Field 
and Weismann apparently decided that their strongest argument was that 
the hours provision was illicit class legislation, and they emphasized this 
point in their brief. First, they argued that the hours provision was class 
legislation because it applied to some bakers and not to others.162 
According to Lochner’s brief, the hours provision did not cover at least 
one-third to one-half of people in the baking business because they worked 
not in the biscuit, bread, or cake bakeries covered by the law, but in pie 
bakeries, hotels, restaurants, clubs, boarding houses, or for private 
families. The brief alleged that working conditions for these bakers were 
actually less sanitary and healthful than those of the modern bakery.163 
What most of the unregulated workers had in common was that their 
work was seasonal and often involved long hours in season. The 
legislature exempted these workers not because the health risks to them 
were small compared to the health risks to other bakers, but because the 
legislature chose to exempt one class of workers for the benefit of their 
employers.164 The hours provision, moreover, allowed bakery owners to 
work as many hours as they chose. This meant that the more than one-half 
of all bakeries in New York that were owner- or family-operated were not 
covered by the law.165 The meager and inconsistent coverage of the hours 
provision, the brief argued, showed that the law was unconstitutional class 
legislation. 
The next part of the brief argued that the hours law was not within the 
police power because there was no reason to single out bakers for special 
regulation. The brief argued that unlike mining, the subject of Holden v. 
Hardy, baking was a generally healthful occupation. Allowing baking to 
be subject to the police power “would mean that all trades will eventually 
be held within the police power.”166 The brief included an appendix 
compiling further evidence of the relative healthfulness of baking.167 
 161. Atkin, 191 U.S. 207, 220–24 (1903); Knoxville Iron Co., 183 U.S. 13, 18–22 (1901); Holden, 
169 U.S. 366, 388–98 (1898). 
 162. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 7–8, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (No. 292), 
reprinted in 14 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 653 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds., 1975). 
 163. Id. at 10–11. 
 164. Id. at 10, 12. 
 165. Id. at 8, 15. 
 166. Id. at 34. 
 167. See infra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
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After a thorough (but not especially persuasive) discussion of relevant 
precedents, the brief tried to show that the hours provision of the 
Bakeshop Act was not within the state’s police power because it was not a 
health measure. The brief noted that the law at issue seemed modeled on 
England’s Bakehouse Regulation Act of 1863, except that the English law 
did not regulate adult working hours.168 Meanwhile, the demand from the 
bakers’ union for shorter hours was independent of health considerations. 
The brief explained that the first ten-hour day bill for bakers, introduced in 
1887, contained no sanitary provisions. Moreover, in 1897, when the New 
York legislature consolidated the laws of the state into various categories, 
it put the hours provision of the Bakeshop Act into the Labor Law 
category, while the rest of the Act was placed in the Health Law 
category.169 
The most interesting and influential part of the brief was the appendix, 
referred to by one scholar as “an incipient ‘Brandeis Brief.’”170 Perhaps 
inspired by Judge Vann’s opinion below stating that baking was 
unhealthful, the appendix provided statistics about the health of bakers. 
According to mortality figures from England from 1890 through 1892, 
bakers had a mortality rate of 920, somewhat below the average of 1,000 
for all occupations. The appendix next cited articles from various medical 
journals that recommended sanitary and ventilation reforms to aid the 
health of bakers, but did not advocate shorter hours. Indeed, one article in 
the British medical journal The Lancet mentioned that shorter hours had 
not alleviated the problem.171 The appendix also cited the Reference 
Handbook of Medical Sciences, which stated that out of twenty-one 
occupations, bakers had the eleventh-highest mortality rate, very similar to 
those of cabinet makers, mason and brick layers, blacksmiths, clerks, and 
other mundane occupations. An expert at the British Home Office, 
meanwhile, found that bakers ranked eighteenth out of twenty-two 
occupations for mortality, and they had the lowest rates of pulmonary 
disease.172 
In contrast to Lochner’s lengthy and reasonably thorough brief, New 
York’s brief was only nineteen pages long, and contained very few 
citations to precedents. Perhaps New York’s Attorney General thought 
 168. Brief for the Plaintiff in Error, supra note 162, at 46; see also People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 
373, 382 (N.Y. 1904). 
 169. Brief for the Plaintiff in Error, supra note 162, at 41. 
 170. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 
70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19 n.77 (1991). 
 171. Brief for the Plaintiff in Error, supra note 162, at 57–58. 
 172. Id. at 60. 
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Lochner was an easy case governed by Holden, and therefore was not 
worth wasting resources on. Or perhaps he was distracted by the more 
pressing—and at the time more controversial—Franchise Tax Cases, 
another Supreme Court appeal he was working on that would determine 
the constitutionality of New York’s special franchise tax on streetcar lines, 
gas works, and other public utilities.173 Regardless, New York’s brief 
made three points: first, that the burden was on Lochner to show that the 
law was unconstitutional; second, that the Bakeshop Act’s purpose was to 
safeguard both the public health and the health of bakers; and third, that 
the law was within the police power because it was a health law.174 The 
brief also acknowledged that the law targeted immigrant bakers, arguing 
that the law was justified because “there have come to [New York] great 
numbers of foreigners with habits which must be changed. . . .”175 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on February 23, 1905, and 
issued its ruling on April 17, 1905. Much to almost everyone’s surprise, 
Lochner won, in a 5-4 ruling.176 As expected, Justices David Brewer and 
Rufus Peckham, who rarely saw a labor law they thought was 
constitutional, voted in Lochner’s favor. So did Chief Justice Melville 
Fuller, who had dissented with Brewer and Peckham in the Court’s most 
recent major labor regulation case.177 The majority also managed to pick 
up the votes of Justices Henry Brown and Joseph McKenna, neither of 
whom had previously voted to invalidate a state labor regulation for 
infringing Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Lochner’s victory may have been a very close call, as some evidence 
suggests that Justice Peckham’s majority opinion was originally written as 
a dissent, and that Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissenting opinion was 
originally the opinion of the Court.178 Whether one of the Justices indeed 
 173. KENS, supra note 35, at 113. 
 174. Brief for Defendants in Error, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (No. 292), reprinted 
in 14 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 729 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
 175. Id. at 14. 
 176. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 177. See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 224 (1903). 
 178. See CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, A CENTURY AT THE BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 172 (1942) (asserting that John Maynard Harlan, the Justice’s son, stated that his 
father told him that Harlan’s opinion was originally the majority opinion); JOHN E. SEMONCHE, 
CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890–1920, at 
181–82 (1978) (arguing that the internal construction and style of the dissent arguably indicates it was 
intended to be a majority opinion); Alan F. Westin, The Supreme Court and Group Conflict: Thoughts 
on Seeing Burke Put Through the Mill, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 665, 667 n.3 (1958) (stating that Justice 
Harlan’s papers show that he originally wrote a majority opinion for five Justices, but that one Justice 
changed his mind between conference and the final vote). 
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switched his vote at the last minute, and if so why, remains a mystery. As 
for the unusual votes of Brown and McKenna, they can most plausibly be 
attributed to the creativity of Lochner’s brief in presenting a statistics-
filled appendix showing that baking was not an especially unhealthful 
profession, combined with the singularly ineffective brief filed by New 
York.179 
Also surprising, given the Lochner brief’s focus on class legislation, 
Peckham’s majority opinion largely ignored that issue in favor of a 
fundamental rights/due process analysis.180 Peckham began by finding that 
the hours provision of the Bakeshop Act statute clearly interfered with the 
right of contract, a right the Court had recognized in Allgeyer v. Louisiana 
as part of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.181 
Under Holden v. Hardy,182 liberty of contract could be infringed to 
protect “necessitous” workers or to preserve the health of either bakers or 
the public at large. The presumption was in favor of liberty of contract. 
This presumption could be overcome if the law was a “labor law” and was 
needed to redress some deficiency in the bakers’ ability to negotiate their 
contracts, or if the law was a “health law.” Either way, the law would be 
within the state’s police power. Peckham rejected out of hand the idea that 
public health was an adequate rationale for the law. He noted that the 
sanitary provisions of the Bakeshop Act were not at issue, and stated that 
“[c]lean and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker 
works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week.”183  
Peckham also concluded that bakers did not need special aid from the 
state in negotiating their contracts. Peckham argued that unlike women, 
children, and to some extent “necessitous” miners, bakers are “in no sense 
 179. The American Federationist, in an understated postmortem, noted, “[W]e have reason to 
believe that the case as presented on behalf of the state of New York might possibly have been 
improved on, and perhaps with a different result.” AM. FEDERATIONIST, June 1905, at 363–64. 
 Barry Cushman suggests that despite the majority opinion’s focus on liberty of contract, McKenna 
might have been swayed by the argument that the sixty hours law was class legislation. Cushman’s 
theory would explain McKenna’s seemingly wildly inconsistent votes in liberty of contract cases over 
a twenty-year period, and deserves further study. Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of 
Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881, 937 (2005). It seems clear that Peckham’s vigorous pro-liberty of 
contract views, as expressed in Lochner, were not shared by all members of the Lochner majority. See 
Brian Frye, The Accidental Liberty: Chance in Lochner v. New York (2005) (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author).  
 180. For further discussion of this point, see Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra 
note 19. 
 181. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)). 
 182. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 183. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. 
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wards of the state.”184 Thus, unless the hours provision, which “interfer[ed 
with bakers’] independence of judgment and of action,” was intended to 
redress particular health effects of baking, it was unconstitutional as a 
violation of the fundamental right to liberty of contract protected by the 
Due Process Clause.185 
To determine whether the hours provision was indeed a health law, 
Peckham first ascertained whether baking was known to be an unhealthful 
profession. He concluded that baking was an ordinary trade, not generally 
known to be unhealthful.186 Next, Peckham found that the available 
scientific evidence suggested that baking was not an especially unhealthful 
profession.187 For this conclusion, he clearly relied on—but, to the 
detriment of his reputation, did not explicitly cite—the studies discussed in 
the appendix to Lochner’s brief showing bakers had similar mortality rates 
to many ordinary professions that the legislature did not regulate.188 Given, 
in Peckham’s view, the absence of any sound reason to believe that the 
maximum hours law was in fact a health law, it was not a valid police 
power measure, but a “mere meddlesome interference[] with the rights of 
the individual,”189 and an unconstitutional violation of liberty of contract. 
Peckham concluded that  
[t]he act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, 
but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both 
employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon 
such terms as they may think best, or which they may agree upon 
with the other parties to such contracts.190 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 58–59 (“To the common understanding the trade of a baker has never been regarded as 
an unhealthy one.”); cf. id. at 63 (criticizing increased legislative interference with the “ordinary 
trades”).  
 187. Id. at 58 (finding “no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as 
a health law to safeguard the public health or the health of [bakers]”). 
 188. Id. at 59–61 (comparing bakers to a wide range of other occupations, shown by Lochner’s 
brief to be approximately as healthful as baking, that could also be regulated if the bakers’ law was 
upheld, but never noting any reliance on data from the brief). For strong criticism of Peckham’s 
reasoning, see Bewig supra note 37. Bewig criticizes Peckham on two grounds: first, he criticizes the 
use of mortality tables, which ignore morbidity, and some evidence suggested that bakers were less 
healthy than other workers. Id. at 494. Second, Bewig argues that Peckham’s reasoning suggested that 
members of a particular class of employees could never seek ameliorative health legislation unless 
their health was worse than average—even if the legislation in question would significantly improve 
their health.  Id. at 494–95. 
 189. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61. 
 190. Id. 
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Peckham noted that the other provisions of the act, which related to 
sanitary concerns, might be valid, but the sixty-hour workweek was not.191 
Finally, Peckham noted that the incidences of legislative interference in 
the workplace under the guise of health regulation had been increasing.192 
In examining purported health laws,  
[t]he purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and 
legal effect of the language employed; and whether it is or is not 
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be 
determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into 
operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose.193 
Justice John Marshall Harlan, joined by Justices Edward White and 
William Day, wrote the main dissent. Harlan argued that the state police 
power extends “at least to the protection of the lives, the health and the 
safety of the public against the injurious exercise by any citizen of his own 
rights,” and that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to interfere 
with this police power.194 Thus, Harlan said, while there exists a clear right 
to liberty of contract, it may be subordinated to a lawful exercise of police 
power.195 According to Harlan, the Court should only invalidate a 
purported health or safety law if the law had “no real or substantial 
relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable 
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”196 Any doubts should 
be resolved in favor of the statute. 
Harlan then asserted that the purpose of the hours provision of the 
Bakeshop Act was at least in part to protect bakers’ health. Harlan quoted 
medical treatises and statistics that supported the claim that work done by 
bakers was unhealthful.197 Where he came across these data is unclear, 
because they do not appear in New York’s brief.198 Harlan argued that it 
was reasonable for New York to presume that labor in excess of ten hours 
per day in a bakery “may endanger the health, and shorten the lives of the 
workmen, thereby diminishing their physical and mental capacity to serve 
the State, and to provide for those dependent upon them.”199 Because the 
 191. Id. at 61–62. 
 192. Id. at 63–64. 
 193. Id. at 64. 
 194. Id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 65–66.  
 196. Id. at 68. 
 197. Id. at 70–71.  
 198. See Brief for Defendants, supra note 174. 
 199. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72. 
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statute was not “plainly and palpably” inconsistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it should be upheld.200 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes filed a lone dissent, one of the most 
celebrated dissenting opinions in American constitutional history. Holmes 
asserted that the majority’s opinion was based on “an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain.”201 He contended that 
the state’s power to interfere with the right to contract in ways that could 
not easily be distinguished from the bakers’ hours law, including such 
ancient laws as those against usury and work on Sundays, was well 
established.202 “[A] Constitution,” Holmes wrote, “is not intended to 
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the 
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”203 “The 
Fourteenth Amendment,” he added, “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics,” a famous book by an English sociologist advocating 
laissez-faire.204 After all, noted Holmes, the Supreme Court had, over the 
years, permitted many interferences with laissez-faire challenged under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, according to Holmes the term 
“liberty” is perverted whenever it is “held to prevent the natural outcome 
of a dominant opinion,” save when everyone could agree that a challenged 
statute “would infringe fundamental principles as they have been 
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”205 He argued that 
a reasonable person could find the hours provision to be a valid health 
measure, and therefore the law should be upheld. 
D. The Reaction to Lochner 
The initial reaction of the Baker’s Journal to the Lochner decision was 
surprisingly muted. The Journal editorialized on April 22, 1905 that the 
decision just showed that “under the present conditions [bakers’] rights 
 200. Id. at 73. 
 201. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (emphasis added). This remark by Holmes seems to be the basis for the decades-old claim 
that the Lochner majority was motivated by Social Darwinism, as many people consider Spencer to 
have been a leading Social Darwinist. However, in context it is clear that Holmes is using Spencer as 
an example of a believer in extreme laissez-faire libertarianism, and is not accusing the majority of 
Social Darwinism. Holmes may have chosen Spencer because Holmes was a master of the flip 
aphorism, and Spencer’s Social Statics is a memorable alliteration. The source of the continuing 
confusion about Social Darwinism seems to be that, as an informal survey I took suggests, the vast 
majority of constitutional law professors have no idea what Social Statics is, but do know that Spencer 
is reputed to have been a Social Darwinist. 
 205. Id. at 76. 
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and their interest will only be preserved and defended by their own 
organization and power.”206 As the decision sank in, however, the 
Journal’s editorials grew far harsher. A May 20, 1905, Journal column 
stated that Lochner was the “hardest blow ever dealt by the courts of this 
country to organized labor.”207 A week later, the Journal editor wrote that 
“[t]he bakery workers die like flies, of consumption, rheumatism and other 
physical punishments for the breaking of nature’s laws. But what do the 
learned justices care for the laws of nature? Capitalist laws are alone 
sacred to them! What are wage workers for but to be exploited!”208 The 
union threatened a massive strike on May 1st, but that threat came to 
naught.209 
Ultimately, however, the bakers’ union had little reason to complain 
about the Lochner ruling, if actual hours worked by bakers—as opposed to 
giving the union a bargaining tool against recalcitrant bakery owners—
was the relevant issue. In the ten years since the Bakeshop Act had 
become law, productivity and working conditions had improved 
throughout the United States as the nation grew richer. Shorter hours were 
becoming the norm nationwide, including in the baking industry.210 By 
1909, less than nine percent of bakers nationwide worked more than ten 
hours a day, and, by 1919, eighty-seven percent of bakers worked nine 
hours a day or less and only three percent of bakers worked more than ten 
hours a day.211 The practical effect of Lochner on bakers’ hours was very 
small. 
Meanwhile, the master bakers who had fought the law were jubilant. 
On May 16th, they held a banquet in honor of Henry Weismann, who 
effused: 
Another of our guaranteed liberties, which has come down to loss 
from the days of Magna Charta, and the petition rights has been 
safeguarded anew, and the vast conservative business interests of 
the land on April 17, 1905, were permitted to breathe a sigh of relief 
 206. Bake Shop Law of the State of New York Prescribing Ten Hours a Day and Sixty Hours Week 
for Labor in Bakeries Declared Unconstitutional by United States Supreme Court, BAKER’S J., Apr. 
22, 1905, at 1. 
 207. The Decision of the United States Supreme Court on the Ten-Hour Law for Employees of 
Bakeries—The Passage and Provisions of the Law, BAKER’S J., May 20, 1905, at 1. 
 208. The Decision of the Supreme Court, BAKER’S J., May 27, 1905, at 2. 
 209. The Strike Situation, BAKERS REV., June 1905, at 33. 
 210. See Less Hours of Labor, BAKER’S J., Nov. 10, 1900, at 1 (stating that a ten-hour day has 
been established nationwide in bread factories and wherever the union is strong, but not in cellar 
bakeries). 
 211. HAZEL KYRK & JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, THE AMERICAN BAKING INDUSTRY 60–61, 108 
(1925). 
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when this decision was flashed over the wires, a warning to the 
Radicals and Socialists, who would subvert individual liberties to 
the paternal sway of the State, and an inspiration to those who still 
believe in the old-time doctrines of Americanism, that every man 
shall be allowed to employ in honest and legitimate labor, all the 
genius in force within him, to acquire property, comfort, and, if you 
please, such wealth as may serve to place him above the cares and 
trials of want and poverty.212 
The state Master Bakers’ Association gave Weismann a “valuable 
diamond ring” as a token of its thanks, and the Confectioners’ Association 
presented Weismann with a check for two hundred dollars.213  
John Rausch, vice-president of the Bakers’ Association, not only 
celebrated the victory, but also struck a conciliatory note with regard to the 
journeymen bakers, if not their unions:  
Gentlemen, while we are at this hour celebrating and rejoicing over 
our victory, which so rightfully belonged to us, I want to say to you, 
do not let us become intoxicated with joy. Remember that we have 
only won the battle, while the war is still going on. So, whatever 
you do with our conquered fellow-men, I would say, treat them the 
same as you would if the ten-hour law was still in force. Do not take 
any advantage of them, because we have won. Convince your 
journeymen bakers that we are not as bad as they paid us; convince 
them that you are their friends and not tyrants, as we are commonly 
called. Convince them that they were misled, and misguided by 
some discontented and disheartened agitator, and if we succeed 
convincing our friends of what I say, let us hope that the war will 
soon be over an employer and employee will again work 
harmoniously side by side, same as in the good olden time.214 
Of course, interested observers understood that the ramifications of the 
Lochner decision could reach well beyond the issue of bakers’ hours, and 
the decision provoked strong reactions from various commentators. The 
few libertarian periodicals of the day hailed Lochner, seeing it as a blow 
against labor union tyranny. The Nation, for example, editorialized that the 
main effect of the decision “will be to stop the subterfuge by which, under 
the pretext of conserving the public health, the unionists have sought to 
 212. See Celebration of Victory, supra note 98. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 42. 
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delimit the competition of non-unionists, and so to establish a quasi-
monopoly of many important kinds of labor.”215  
Editorials in some major newspapers also applauded the decision. The 
New York Times praised the Supreme Court for refusing to enforce “any 
contracts which may have been made between the demagogues in the 
Legislature and the ignoramuses among the labor leaders in bringing to 
naught their combined machinations.”216 The Washington Post initially 
noted that the opinion allowed for reasonable police power regulation.217 
The Post, defending the Court from its critics, later added that the liberty 
of contract between employer and employee protected in Lochner “is a 
principle older than the Constitution or the statutes. Its maintenance is 
indispensable to the preservation of liberty.”218 The Los Angeles Times 
published two editorials praising Lochner.219 The Literary Digest reported 
that the Brooklyn Eagle, New York Press, Brooklyn Standard Union, 
Baltimore Sun, and Baltimore News all praised the decision.220 
Some law review commentary also favored Lochner. An author wrote 
in the American Law Review, “[i]f a Constitution is to be interpreted to 
mean whatever the dominant opinion of a legislature or a State may 
entertain for the time being, what is the use of having any constitution?”221 
In contrast, the Lochner ruling met with immediate condemnation in 
Progressive and labor union circles,222 and in some mainstream 
newspapers.223 According to one historian, “[n]ot since the debacle of 
1895 [when the Supreme Court invalidated the federal income tax and 
upheld an injunction against Eugene V. Debs’s American Railway Union 
strike] had a case stirred as much protest in the popular press and 
professional journals. What was at issue was not simply the law in the case 
but a nationwide movement to use government to redress imbalances in 
 215. Editorial, A Check to Union Tyranny, 80 NATION 346, 347 (1905). 
 216. Editorial, Fussy Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1905, at 10. 
 217. Regulating Hours of Labor, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1905, at 6. 
 218. Editorial, Reckless Criticism, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1905, at 6. 
 219. Editorial, Bakeshop Law Knocked Out, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1905, at 7; Editorial, Stands by 
the Constitution, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1905, at 7. 
 220. Supreme Court on the Ten-Hour Law, LITERARY DIGEST, Apr. 29, 1905, at 613. 
 221. Note, supra note 110, at 453. 
 222. See Labor Press on the Ten-Hour Law, LITERARY DIGEST, May 6, 1905, at 654. 
 223. The Brooklyn Times, Brooklyn Citizen, and Philadelphia Press criticized the decision. See id. 
Theodore Roosevelt was among those upset by Lochner, and he raised the case as a campaign issue in 
1912. Theodore Roosevelt, Judges and Progress, 100 OUTLOOK 40, 43 (1912) (criticizing the 
“Bakeshop case”); Theodore Roosevelt, Workman’s Compensation, 98 OUTLOOK 49, 53 (1911) 
(arguing that courts should not be allowed to “shackle” legislatures as they did in Lochner and other 
cases); Theodore Roosevelt, Address at Carnegie Hall: The Right of the People to Rule, New York 
City, Mar. 20, 1912, available at http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trrotptr.html. 
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the industrial society.”224 Progressives and labor activists had railed for 
years against “reactionary” state court decisions invalidating labor 
regulations, but had taken comfort in the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court had consistently voted to uphold labor reforms. Now, 
however, the Supreme Court, in issuing its first decision holding a state 
labor law void, had seemingly gone over to the dark side.225 
Progressive legal scholars joined the chorus of condemnation. 
Somehow overlooking both the appendix to Lochner’s brief and Justice 
Peckham’s blunt statement that his view of the relative healthfulness of 
baking was informed by “looking through statistics regarding all trades 
and occupations,”226 legal scholars such as Roscoe Pound, Ernst Freund, 
and Learned Hand accused the Lochner majority of engaging in 
“mechanical jurisprudence,” or abstract reasoning, instead of relying on 
modern scientific knowledge about the health effects of long hours on 
bakers.227 Hostility to Lochner’s purported formalism228 directly led to the 
development of what became known as sociological jurisprudence. 
Sociological jurisprudence held that the purpose of law is to achieve social 
aims, and that legal rules, including constitutional rules, cannot be 
deduced from first principles.229 Accordingly, abstract notions of rights 
should not bind judges.230 Instead, judges should consider the public 
interest and modern social conditions or “social facts” when interpreting 
the Constitution. Sociological jurisprudence came to dominate the leading 
law schools and had significant impact on one of the most important 
innovations in legal thought in the twentieth century, legal realism.231 
 224. SEMONCHE, supra note 178, at 184. 
 225. Ernst Freund, Limitation of Hours of Labor and the Federal Supreme Court, 17 GREEN BAG 
411, 413 (1905). 
 226. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905). 
 227. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 225; Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour 
Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495, 501–08 (1908); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. 
REV. 605, 615–16 (1908). 
 228. Such hostility continues to the present day. See Laura Kalman, Eating Spaghetti With a 
Spoon, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1549 (1997); R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation 
and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 121, 191 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511 (1988) (“Few 
decisions are charged with formalism as often as Lochner v. New York.”); Steve Sheppard, The State 
Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Between the Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 
45 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 972 n.12 (1994).  
 229. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909). 
 230. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 467 (1916). 
 231. See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Legal Realism: Jurisprudence 
and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972). 
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Many advocates of sociological jurisprudence saw attorney Louis 
Brandeis’s Supreme Court brief in Muller v. Oregon232 in 1908 as a 
successful attempt to put principles into practice. The brief contained only 
a short legal argument, but it provided the Court with many pages of 
sociological reports and data supporting maximum hours laws for 
women.233 Brandeis’s brief was less radical than it seemed; he knew that 
Oregon was filing a traditional brief in the case so he did not need to 
reiterate the state’s arguments.234 Moreover, the idea of presenting relevant 
data to the Court was actually pioneered not by Brandeis but by Field and 
Weismann in the appendix to their Lochner brief.235 Brandeis was likely 
motivated to write a “sociological” brief by Peckham’s assertion in 
Lochner that he had relied on statistics demonstrating the relative 
healthfulness of baking. Nevertheless, the brief received a mention in the 
Court’s opinion upholding the law at issue (although, many have failed to 
notice, only for reinforcing what the Justices said they already knew from 
“common sense”), and the so-called “Brandeis Brief” became a staple of 
constitutional argument over Progressive reforms.236 
II. HOW LOCHNER BECAME PART OF THE ANTI-CANON 
A. Lochner’s Early Influence 
Despite all this ferment, Lochner turned out to be neither the stuff of 
libertarian dreams nor of Progressive nightmares; rather, for almost two 
decades Lochner turned out to be an aberration. Not that the Court always 
upheld challenged regulations. Indeed, a few of its rulings invalidating 
state laws had significant impacts on American life. Following Lochner, 
the Court invalidated as violations of liberty and property rights protected 
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments laws 
that prohibited employers from forbidding their employees to join labor 
unions.237 These rulings likely inhibited the growth of labor unions. The 
Court also invalidated a Louisville law requiring residential segregation, a 
decision that helped prevent the spread of South African-style apartheid in 
the American South and, by preventing rigid racial zoning, allowed 
 232. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 233. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1960 (2003) (book 
review). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
 236. Bernstein, Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, supra note 233. 
 237. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908). 
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hundreds of thousands of African Americans to leave impoverished rural 
plantations for a better life in cities.238 Finally, in other lines of cases often 
associated with the same aggressive attitude toward judicial review of 
economic regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment as Lochner, the 
Court reviewed state regulation of utility rates to ensure the regulations 
didn’t arbitrarily deprive the utilities of property, and also reviewed state 
tax laws to ensure that they didn’t rely on arbitrary classifications.239 
The most controversial issue of the day, however, was the status of 
labor reform, and at least through the early 1920s the Court rarely 
interfered with labor or health regulations claimed to be within the states’ 
police power.240 In the decade after Lochner, the Court upheld almost 
every state labor reform law that came before it, including laws banning 
child labor;241 regulating the hours of labor of women;242 making mining 
companies liable for their willful failure to furnish a reasonably safe place 
for workers;243 and mandating an eight-hour day for federal workers or 
employees of federal contractors,244 as well as many others. Congress 
altered the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in 1914 to allow the Court to 
review judgments from state courts invalidating state statutes as violations 
of federal constitutional rights.245 Congress did so because it saw the 
Court, with its consistent willingness to uphold reformist legislation, as a 
check on state courts that were invalidating Progressive legislation, 
especially labor legislation. 
By 1917, Lochner seemed to be dead and buried for good. In that year 
the Court upheld four very controversial labor reforms: workers’ 
 238. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); see generally David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober 
Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797 
(1998); David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE 
L.J. 591, 626–40 (2004) (book review). 
 239. See Cushman, supra note 179. Cushman presents these cases as evidence that Lochner era 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence was based primarily on “class legislation” and not individual 
rights considerations. In my view, there were separate lines of cases, and the Lochner line of cases 
primarily focused on individual rights considerations, while the rate regulations cases (associated with 
Smyth v. Ames, not Lochner, and focusing on the property, not liberty language in the Due Process 
Clause) and the tax cases (decided primarily as equal protection, not due process cases) were separate 
lines of cases. 
 240. See Bernstein, Lochner era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 19. 
 241. Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325–26 (1913).  
 242. Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 392–95 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 380–
82 (1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 679–81 (1914); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 
418–23 (1908). 
 243. Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 70–74 (1907). 
 244. Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 254–56 (1907). 
 245. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-224, 38 Stat. 790 (1914).  
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compensation laws,246 a federal law that not only limited railroad workers 
to an eight-hour day but also fixed wages at the level the workers had 
received when working longer hours,247 a minimum wage law for 
women,248 and a maximum hours law for all industrial workers.249 The 
latter ruling seemed to directly contradict Lochner and therefore overruled 
its specific holding sub silentio.250 
Lochner, however, underwent a surprising renaissance in the 1920s 
when the more aggressively Lochnerian wing of the Court, bolstered by 
four appointments by President Warren Harding, took firm control. With a 
strong Lochnerian majority in place, led by Chief Justice (and former 
president) William Howard Taft, the Court both reviewed economic 
regulation much more aggressively than it had in the past and also applied 
Lochnerian jurisprudence outside the economic realm.  
The Court froze and formalized various doctrinal exceptions to liberty 
of contract, such as the government’s virtual carte blanche to regulate 
businesses “affected with a public interest.” In Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. 
Court of Industrial Relations,251 the Court unanimously held that states 
could not require industrial disputes to be settled by government-imposed 
mandatory arbitration. The state claimed that the industries in question 
were “clothed with a public interest,” which led the Court, in an opinion 
by Chief Justice Taft, to spell out the various categories of businesses 
affected with a public interest.252 By doing so, Taft ensured that the 
“affected with a public interest” doctrine would be limited to those 
categories, and would no longer be expanded on a case-by-case basis. 
In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, a 5-3 majority of the Court explicitly 
revived Lochner while invalidating a minimum wage law for women.253 
The Adkins Court announced that “freedom of contract is . . . the general 
rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to 
abridge it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional 
 246. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 
210 (1917); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
 247. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917). 
 248. Simpson v. O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629, 629–30 (1917). This was actually a 4-4 decision. Justice 
Brandeis recused himself because he had worked on the case before being appointed to the Supreme 
Court, but he clearly would have cast the fifth vote for upholding such laws. 
 249. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
 250. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 564 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting) (“It is 
impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and I have always supposed 
that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio.”). 
 251. 262 U.S. 522 (1923). 
 252. Id. at 535.  
 253. 261 U.S. 525. 
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circumstances.”254 The Court acknowledged that government regulation 
could be used for traditional police power purposes. Beyond that, the 
Court asserted that precedent limited interference with liberty of contract 
in the labor context to cases involving the following issues: (1) “[t]hose 
dealing with statutes fixing rates and charges to be exacted by businesses 
impressed with a public interest;” (2) “[s]tatutes relating to contracts for 
the performance of public work;” (3) “[s]tatutes prescribing the character, 
methods and time for payment of wages;” and (4) “[s]tatutes fixing hours 
of labor” to preserve the health and safety for workers or the public at 
large.255 Thus, during the Taft Court era the exceptions to liberty of 
contract created by prior Court decisions were retained, but they were 
categorized and applied narrowly to prevent what the Court saw as further 
erosion of individual liberty. 
It was only after Adkins that Lochner was no longer an anomaly. The 
next decade or so was the only time in Supreme Court history in which the 
Court did not apply a strong presumption of constitutionality to economic 
regulation. Even so, the Taft Court upheld most of the laws that came 
before it, including such far-reaching regulatory innovations as 
exclusionary zoning256 and massive regulation of the railroad labor 
market.257  
Often overlooked in histories of the Supreme Court in the 1920s is that 
the Court not only revived Lochner’s protection of liberty of contract, but 
also began to protect what today we call civil liberties. The Court also 
resolved the ongoing ambiguity over whether the Due Process Clause 
protected non-economic rights. In the wake of abuses by the Wilson 
Administration during and after World War I and by state governments 
overcome with nativist hysteria after the War—abuses that included 
Palmer Raids, imprisonment of antiwar dissidents, and Ku Klux Klan-
inspired laws intended to shut down Catholic schools—the Court broadly 
expanded protection under the Due Process Clause beyond economic 
liberties.258 
 254. Id. at 546.  
 255. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546–48. 
 256. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 257. Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). 
 258. See generally M.B. Carrott, The Supreme Court and Minority Rights in the Nineteen-
Twenties, 41 N.W. OHIO Q. 144 (1969) (reviewing these decisions and suggesting that the Court was 
motivated in part by a desire to win political support from African Americans, Catholics, and other 
groups). 
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The expansion of Lochnerian due process jurisprudence to civil 
liberties began with Meyer v. Nebraska,259 in which the Court invalidated a 
Nebraska law that banned the teaching of German in private schools or by 
private tutors. Arch-Lochnerian Justice James McReynolds wrote a 
sweeping opinion holding that the Due Process Clause protects a wide 
range of freedoms, including not only the “right of the individual to 
contract,” and “to engage in any of the common occupations of life,” but 
also “to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, [and] to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience,” along with other “privileges long recognized at common law 
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”260 
Two years later in Gitlow v. New York,261 the Court stated that it 
assumed that freedom of expression was protected against the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions that followed invalidated laws banning 
private schools,262 forbidding private Japanese language schools,263 and 
banning display of the Communist flag.264 All of these cases were decided 
on the ground that they involved fundamental liberties protected by the 
Due Process Clause.265 
B. The Fall of the House of Lochner 
As it turned out, however, the 1920s and the Taft Court represented the 
last gasp of classical liberal principles in American public life for decades 
to come. By the 1920s, libertarian views, especially on economics, had 
already been marginalized among American intellectuals,266 but they 
retained a tenuous foothold in elite legal circles despite the onslaught of 
 259. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 260. Id. 
 261. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of 
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). See also Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (“It has been determined that the conception of liberty under the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.”); Fiske v. 
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (unanimously invalidating a criminal conviction as a violation of the 
right to freedom of speech). 
 262. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 263. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
 264. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 359. 
 265. Gitlow is often incorrectly treated as an “incorporation” case. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, 
Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and Reverse Incorporation, in 
BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 71, 73 (Terry 
Eastland ed., 1995). 
 266. See generally ARTHUR EKIRCH, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1960). 
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sociological jurisprudence and legal realism.267 The classical liberal 
foundations of Lochnerian jurisprudence, however, could not survive the 
strains of the Great Depression. With almost no support among the 
intellectual class, with the unemployed and underemployed clamoring for 
government intervention, and with statism ascendant across the globe in 
the forms of fascism, communism, and social democracy—each of which 
had its share of admirers in the United States—the Court’s commitment to 
limited government seemed outlandishly reactionary to much of the 
public.268 The Court’s Lochnerian position that libertarian presumptions 
were fundamental to Anglo-American liberty became untenable as the 
Depression wore on, with many Americans blaming the purported laissez-
faire policies of previous administrations for the continuing economic 
crisis.269 
Given the lack of intellectual and public support for Lochnerism, its 
demise was inevitable, but still required a change of personnel on the 
Court. President Hoover, a Progressive Republican, put the first nails into 
Lochner’s coffin by appointing to the Court Justices Charles Evan Hughes, 
Owen Roberts, and Benjamin Cardozo, each of whom had views well to 
the left of the conservatives who dominated the Court in the 1920s. By 
1934, a majority had formed willing to broadly expand the “affected with 
a public interest” doctrine to the point where just about any regulation of 
prices was constitutional.270 After a short period of resistance to the more 
extreme aspects of the New Deal, in 1937 the Court reversed Adkins and 
upheld a minimum wage law for women.271 A majority of the Court was 
still willing to review economic legislation to ensure it was not an 
arbitrary violation of liberty of contract, albeit on a more forgiving basis 
than previously.272 However, President Franklin Roosevelt sealed 
Lochner’s fate by appointing a series of New Dealers and other political 
 267. See, e.g., William Howard Taft, Mr. Wilson and the Campaign, 10 YALE REV. 1, 19–20 
(1921). “There is no greater domestic issue in the election than the maintenance of the Supreme Court 
as the bulwark to enforce the guaranty that no man shall be deprived of his property without due 
process of law.”). 
 268. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 19, at 50. 
 269. Id. at 50–51. 
 270. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533 (1934) (defining “affected with a public 
interest” as “subject to the exercise of the police power”). 
 271. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 272. See generally Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and 
the Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 56 (1999) (noting that West 
Coast Hotel did not “overrule Lochner or any liberty of occupation case not involving an attempt to 
require [employers to pay] a subsistence wage”).  
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allies to the Court, who soon declared that economic legislation was 
subject only to the most minimal constitutional scrutiny.273  
C. The Wilderness Years 
For several decades after the triumph of the New Deal, Lochner itself 
was cited by the courts and by legal scholars primarily for Justice Holmes’ 
dissent, which reflected the post-New Deal consensus that the courts 
should not interfere with economic legislation. Holmes’ claim that the 
Lochner Court had erred in reading its own values into the Constitution 
became the dominant critique of Lochnerian jurisprudence, and his quip 
about “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics” led many scholars to 
wrongly conclude that the Court was motivated by Spencerian Social 
Darwinism.274 
The Lochner majority opinion, while recognized as a significant 
victory for “economic substantive due process,”275 did not yet have the 
symbolic resonance that it later acquired. Legal scholars and 
commentators, if they mentioned Lochner at all, generally lumped 
Lochner in with other cases invalidating economic regulations,276 and the 
Supreme Court only once singled Lochner out for special attention.277 
 273. This line of jurisprudence started in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 
(1938). 
 274. See supra note 227. 
 275. “Substantive due process” was itself something of a neologism, rarely used during the 
Lochner era, and never in a Supreme Court opinion. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE NEW DEAL 245 (2000) (explaining that it was not until the 1950s that jurisprudence under the Due 
Process Clause was separated by courts and legal scholars into “substantive” and “procedural” 
categories). 
 276. E.g., SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE 159 (1956). There 
were occasional exceptions. See, e.g., Westin, supra note 178. 
 277. Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 92 (1958) (“to protect the rights asserted 
here would make the ghost of Lochner v. New York walk again” (citations omitted)). Cf. Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (“In this manner the Due Process Clause was used, for example, to 
nullify laws prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries, Lochner v. New York, outlawing 
“yellow dog” contracts, Coppage v. Kansas, setting minimum wages for women, Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital, and fixing the weight of loaves of bread, Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan.” (citation 
omitted)); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (“The liberty of contract 
argument pressed on us is reminiscent of the philosophy of Lochner v. New York, which invalidated a 
New York law prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries; Coppage v. Kansas, which struck 
down a Kansas statute outlawing “yellow dog” contracts; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, which held 
unconstitutional a federal statute fixing minimum wage standards for women in the District of 
Columbia, and others of that vintage.” (citations omitted)); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & 
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (“The Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine 
was for some years followed by this Court. It was used to strike down laws fixing minimum wages and 
maximum hours in employment, laws fixing prices, and laws regulating business activities.”) 
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Lochner makes only the briefest of cameo appearances in the leading post-
New Deal postmortem on judicial review of economic regulation.278 
Lochnerian fundamental rights analysis, however, lived on. The Court, 
while largely abandoning review of economic regulations under the Due 
Process Clause, gradually incorporated most of the rights protected by the 
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
thereby continuing to enforce fundamental rights against the states via 
what came to be known as “substantive due process.” The incorporation 
doctrine on the one hand limited the scope of judicially enforceable 
fundamental rights by associating them with the text of the Bill of Rights, 
rather than basing them simply on the Justices’ own understanding of 
fundamental rights—though the Justices retained some flexibility because 
incorporation was only applied to selected rights.279 On the other hand, 
incorporation expanded the scope of fundamental rights by providing 
federal protection against the states for the Bill of Rights’ criminal 
procedure provisions, which had been rejected during the Lochner 
period.280 
The post-Lochner reincarnation of fundamental rights began in 1937 in 
Palko v. Connecticut, with all of the “Progressive” Justices joining a 
Cardozo opinion stating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against 
the states all rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”281 The 
Court also expressed its reluctance to entirely abandon judicial review of 
purported police power regulations in the famous Footnote Four of the 
1938 Carolene Products case.282 The Court suggested that “[t]here may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”283 
Footnote Four also suggested that the Court was willing to preserve the 
Lochnerian civil liberties decisions of the 1920s and 1930s by 
reinterpreting them as decisions protecting “discrete and insular 
 278. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and 
Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 44 (quoting Lincoln Fed. Labor Union, 335 U.S. at 535, as decrying 
“the Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage” doctrine). 
 279. See Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New 
Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 459–66 (2001). 
 280. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
 281. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 282. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 283. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
p1469 Bernstein book pages.doc5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] LOCHNER CENTENNIAL RETROSPECTIVE 1513 
 
 
 
 
 
 
minorities.”284 Cases cited by the Court in Footnote Four, including the 
civil liberties decisions of the 1920s, were reinterpreted as decisions 
invalidating statutes because the (facially-neutral) laws in question were 
“directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities.”285 Laws 
that threaten such groups “may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.”286 Protection of discrete and insular minorities from 
hostile legislation by an equal protection analysis is a limited, modern 
liberal version of the older prohibition against class legislation, with the 
caveat that the modern version allows, and in some cases requires, the 
Court to inquire into the legislative intent of facially-neutral laws.287 
Protection of non-textual rights under the Due Process Clause largely 
disappeared for a couple of decades.288 An exception was Bolling v. 
Sharpe,289 a companion case to Brown v. Board of Education290 that arose 
in the District of Columbia.291 Because Bolling was a federal case, it had to 
be decided under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the 
Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court interpreted Bolling as an 
equal protection case,292 and eventually held that the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause contains an equal protection guarantee precisely 
equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.293 However, a close reading of Bolling reveals that while dicta in 
Bolling states that the concept of due process overlaps to some extent with 
the concept of equal protection, the ultimate holding of the Court is based 
 284. Id. at 249. 
 285. Id. (citations omitted). 
 286. Id. 
 287. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that laws with discriminatory 
effects are generally unconstitutional only if they also had discriminatory intent). 
 288. For example, in 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), 
Justice Douglas, for the Court, declined to address whether a statute requiring sterilization of criminals 
violated due process as beyond the police power, and instead focused his opinion on equal protection. 
Only Justices Stone and Jackson were willing to hold that the law violated due process. 
 289. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 290. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 291. For a discussion, see David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process and 
Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005). 
 292. E.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (“[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains 
no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of 
due process.’” (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 457, 499 (1954))). 
 293. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth 
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). As we shall see, the statement in this parenthetical is incorrect, 
but it does reflect the state of the law from 1975 until today. 
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on the traditional due process concern that the government not engage in 
arbitrary deprivations of liberty.294 
Bolling concluded that the federal government had no legitimate 
government interest in requiring segregated education that could overcome 
blacks’ contrary liberty interest not to be relegated to Jim Crow schools.295 
The initial draft opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren cited Meyer and 
Pierce in support of the ruling, but those citations were ultimately deleted 
to satisfy hardcore anti-Lochnerian Justice Black.296 The final opinion, 
however, retained a reference to the most significant Lochner era due 
process case to overturn a racially discriminatory law, Buchanan v. 
Warley.297 
D. Lochner’s Growing Significance To Constitutional Debate: 1960s 
In the 1960s, with the unanimity Warren desired for the segregation 
opinions no longer imperative, some Justices grew less shy about citing 
Lochnerian precedents. A turning point came in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.298 Thomas Emerson, arguing for the plaintiffs, asked the 
Court to rely on the broad understanding of due process articulated by 
Justice McReynold in Meyer v. Nebraska, and also favorably cited Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters.299 
At oral argument, the Court questioned Emerson about his due process 
argument: 
 THE COURT: But you expect us to determine whether, it’s 
sufficiently shocking to our sense of what ought to be the law, 
because this applies to married people only? 
 MR. EMERSON: Yes, Your Honor. But it is not broad due 
process in the sense in which the issue was raised in the 1930’s. In 
the first place, this is not a regulation which deals with economic or 
commercial matters. It is a regulation that touches upon individual 
rights: the right to protect life and health, the right of advancing 
scientific knowledge, the right to have children voluntarily. And 
 294. See Bernstein, supra note 291. 
 295. Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 305 (1990) (statement of J. 
Souter). 
 296. See Bernstein, supra note 291. 
 297. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 298. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 299. Brief for Appellant at 14, 17, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496). 
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therefore, we say we are not asking this Court to revive Lochner 
against New York, or to overrule Nebbia or West Coast Hotel. 
 THE COURT: It sounds to me like you’re asking us to follow 
the constitutional philosophy of that case. 
 MR. EMERSON: No, Your Honor. We are asking you to follow 
the philosophy of Meyer against Nebraska and Pierce against the 
Society of Sisters, which dealt with—Meyer against Nebraska— 
 THE COURT: Was the one that held it was unconstitutional, as I 
recall it, for a state to try to regulate the size of loaves of bread— 
 MR. EMERSON: No, no, no. 
 THE COURT: —because people were being defrauded; was that 
it? 
 MR. EMERSON: That was the Lochner case [sic, it was Jay 
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504], Your Honor. Meyer 
against Nebraska held that it was unconstitutional for a state to 
enact a law prohibiting the teaching of the German language to 
children who had not passed the eighth grade. And Pierce against 
the Society of Sisters held that it was unconstitutional for a state to 
prevent the operation of private schools in a state. And those were 
b[o]th due process cases, were decided as due process cases. And 
the Aptheker case—well, I would bring within this rule the Schware 
case, Schware against the Board of Bar Examiners, and the 
Aptheker case most recently. All were due process cases which 
related to individual rights and liberties, and we distinguish those 
from the cases which involved commercial operations like Lochner 
against New York and West Coast Hotel against Parrish. We make 
that very definite distinction.300 
Emerson’s argument was highly persuasive. Justice Douglas’s plurality 
opinion for the Court relied in part on Meyer and Pierce for the 
proposition that the Due Process Clause protects a fundamental 
unenumerated right to privacy.301 Douglas denied, however, that he was 
turning Lochnerian. He wrote: “Overtones of some arguments suggest that 
Lochner v. State of New York should be our guide. But we decline that 
 300. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (No. 496), 
available at http://members.aol.com/abtrbng2/oa/griswoldoa.htm. 
 301. Douglas, though, treated Meyer and Pierce as First Amendment cases, a huge stretch to say 
the least. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83. 
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invitation. . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the 
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions.”302 Douglas, moreover, claimed that 
he was not relying on “substantive due process,” but on the “penumbras, 
formed by emanations” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
amendments.303 
Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion for three Justices, while most 
famous for its discussion of the Ninth Amendment, actually relies on 
Meyer for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause protects rights not enumerated in the Bill of Rights.304 Goldberg’s 
Ninth Amendment discussion is used to merely support the idea that when 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court may go outside the Bill 
of Rights in figuring out which rights should be deemed “fundamental” 
and thus worthy of constitutional protection.305 
Justice Harlan’s lone concurrence, meanwhile, stated that “the proper 
constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute 
infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
the enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.’”306 Harlan referred readers to his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, which 
itself relied generally on a host of Lochner era cases for the proposition 
that police power concerns need to be balanced against liberty interests.307 
In Poe, Harlan directly relied on Meyer and Pierce to support his view that 
the right of a married couple to use contraceptives was protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.308 Justice White, meanwhile, wrote in his 
Griswold concurrence that “[s]uffice it to say that this is not the first time 
this Court has had occasion to articulate that the liberty entitled to 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right ‘to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children,’ Meyer v. State of Nebraska and 
 302. Id. at 481–82 (citation omitted). 
 303. Id. at 484–85. 
 304. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 305. Goldberg wrote:  
I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is applied against the States by the 
Fourteenth. Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent 
source of rights protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government. 
Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution’s authors that fundamental 
rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that 
the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive. 
Id. at 492. 
 306. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 307. Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 308. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543–44. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
p1469 Bernstein book pages.doc5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] LOCHNER CENTENNIAL RETROSPECTIVE 1517 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘the liberty * * * to direct the upbringing and education of children,’ 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters. . . .”309 
As Jed Rubenfeld notes, cases like Pierce and Meyer are “the true 
parents of the privacy doctrine,” and thus of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on the right to use contraception, to terminate pregnancy, and to 
engage in private consensual sex.310 By resurrecting the Lochnerian notion 
that due process protects fundamental unenumerated rights, the Griswold 
Court ensured that these and other constitutional issues would be decided 
as Due Process cases, rather than being decided based on notions of 
equality under the Equal Protection Clause311 or even left to the political 
branches to sort out.  
Justice Black, dissenting, accused his colleagues of resurrecting 
Lochnerian jurisprudence. He noted that they failed to cite Lochner and a 
few other discredited cases that would support their decision.312 Black 
added: 
The two they do cite and quote from, Meyer v. Nebraska, and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, were both decided in opinions by Mr. 
Justice McReynolds which elaborated the same natural law due 
process philosophy found in Lochner v. New York, one of the cases 
on which he relied in Meyer, along with such other long-discredited 
decisions as, e.g., Adams v. Tanner and Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital.313 
The discussion of Lochner by Douglas and Black in Griswold seems to 
have provoked a greater focus on the case.314 Legal scholars increasingly 
 309. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 310. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 743 (1989); see generally KEN 
I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES (2004) (explaining that until the post-World War II era, it 
was the “conservatives” who typically supported constitutional privacy rights, and “Progressives” who 
typically were opposed.). 
 311. John Hart Ely, serving as Earl Warren’s clerk, argued that the Griswold opinion should rely 
on an equal protection argument that the Connecticut statute in question prevented the operation of 
birth control clinics for the poor, while better-off patients were able to receive contraceptives from 
private physicians. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 45 (1996).  
 312. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514–15 (Black, J., disenting). The other cases he cited are Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 , and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 
261 U.S. 525. Id. at 515. 
 313. Id. at 516 (citations omitted). 
 314. E.g., Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 
155 (“It is difficult for me to escape the conclusion that under a thin veil of constitutional history, the 
Golberg-Warren-Brennan interpretation of the Ninth Amendment is, as Mr. Justice Black asserts, little 
more than a way of returning to an open-ended concept of substantive due process after Lochner.”); Id. 
at 158 (singling out Lochner once again); Robert. G. McCloskey, Reflections on the Warren Court, 51 
VA. L. REV. 1229, 1269 (1965) (referring to the “Lochner doctrine” of “constitutional supervision in 
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cited Lochner as the paradigmatic police powers case of the pre-New Deal 
era,315 and critics often charged the Warren Court with Lochnerian judicial 
activism.316 With liberals in the majority, however, the Court and its 
defenders mostly brushed off such criticism. 
E. The Tipping Point: Roe v. Wade, the Tribe Treatise, and the 1970s 
While Lochner era due process jurisprudence always had its severe 
critics, Lochner itself did not become a common negative touchstone until 
the early 1970s. Indeed, use of the phrase “Lochner era” to describe the 
Court’s due process jurisprudence of the pre-New Deal period was 
virtually unknown until 1970, when the phrase appeared several times in 
Gerald Gunther’s popular constitutional law casebook.317 Over the next 
several years, the phrase made sporadic appearances in the law review 
literature,318 including in Harvard Law Review forewords by Gunther319 
and Laurence Tribe.320 
the economic field”). Note that McCloskey had recently written an article on “economic substantive 
due process” in which he ignored Lochner. See McCloskey, supra note 278. 
 315. I base this conclusion on a search of Hein-on-Line of law review articles containing the text 
“Lochner v. New York.” See also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS 21 (1970) (using Lochner in this way). 
 316. See 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF AMERICA: TROUBLED 
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 10 (1993) (“[C]omparisons with Lochner were 
frequently made to reproach the Warren Court”). 
 317. GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
982–84 (8th ed. 1970). By contrast, a survey of other constitutional law textbooks published between 
1965 and 1973 reveals that none of them used the phrase “Lochner era.” EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR. ET 
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 621–22, 665–70 (3d ed. 1968) (utilizing Lochner 
as a “main case” and referring to it as the “high water mark” of an era in which the Court gave “wide 
protection for freedom of economic enterprise”); SHERMAN L. COHN, MATERIALS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE FEDERAL-STATE CONCEPT (1968) (ignoring Lochner); 2 
PAUL A. FREUND ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1608–1615 (3d ed. 
1967) (reprinting Lochner among several cases in a section on “regulations of business activity”); 
PAUL G. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 902–05 (3d ed. 1966) (citing 
Lochner as a “note case”); PAUL KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 623, 1333 
(4th ed. 1972) (characterizing Lochner as protecting economic liberty against arbitrary government 
restrictions); WILLIAM LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
313–17 (3d ed. 1970) (utilizing Lochner as a “main case” and criticizing the Court for substituting its 
judgment for legislative judgment); WILLIAM LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 324–30 (2d ed. 1967) (same); JOHN HOWARD VANDERZELL, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1968) (ignoring Lochner). 
 318. A Hein-on-Line search for “Lochner era” in the “most-cited law reviews” finds four uses 
between 1970 and 1972, and another six uses in 1973 and 1974, in the wake of Roe. 
 319. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1972). 
 320. Laurence Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term—Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the 
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 n.35, 8 n.39, 12, 31, 45 & 52 (1973). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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In 1973, Lochner received new prominence in the wake of Roe v. 
Wade.321 In Roe, the majority relied on the Due Process Clause to 
invalidate restrictions on abortion. The Court rejected both a Ninth 
Amendment argument and Douglas’s “penumbras and emanations” 
theory, and instead located the “right to privacy” “in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action.”322 The opinion the Court cited in favor of its understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was none other than Meyer v. Nebraska.323 The 
Court denied that it was engaging in illegitimate judicial activism, and 
favorably cited Holmes’s Lochner dissent.324 Justice Rehnquist responded: 
While the Court’s opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice 
Holmes in Lochner v. New York, the result it reaches is more closely 
attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case. 
As in Lochner and similar cases applying substantive due process 
standards to economic and social welfare legislation, the adoption 
of the compelling state interest standard will inevitably require this 
Court to examine the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of 
these policies in the very process of deciding whether a particular 
state interest put forward may or may not be ‘compelling.’ The 
decision here to break pregnancy into three distinct terms and to 
outline the permissible restrictions the State may impose in each 
one, for example, partakes more of judicial legislation than it does 
of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.325 
The Roe majority opinion also inspired a famous critique by John Hart 
Ely. Ely spent a significant portion of an article analogizing Roe to 
Lochner.326 Meanwhile, the 1975 edition of Gunther’s casebook spent 
seven pages following an excerpt of Lochner discussing “What was wrong 
with Lochner”327; the previous edition had limited its commentary on 
 321. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 322. Id. at 153. 
 323. Arguably, the transition from a partially text-based Griswold to a Lochnerian Roe was 
signaled by the Court’s opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See H. JEFFERSON 
POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 173–79 (1993). 
 324. Roe, 410 U.S. at 118. 
 325. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 326. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 
935–46 (1973). 
 327. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 564–70 (9th ed. 
1975). 
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Lochner to one page.328 The Lochner material appeared in a chapter 
entitled “Substantive Due Process: Rise, Decline, Revival,” which, as the 
title suggests, also included material on Griswold and Roe. Gunther 
presented these cases as substantive due process cases in the same 
jurisprudential tradition, as he attempted to discredit the latter cases.329 
As Lochner became more notorious, use of the phrase “Lochner era” 
continued to gradually expand.330 Gunther titled his casebook’s subsection 
on pre-New Deal liberty of contract jurisprudence “The Lochner Era: 
Judicial Intervention and Economic Regulation.”331 The phrase “Lochner 
era” first appeared in a judicial opinion in Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland in 1977, 
citing Gunther.332 
However, the most important event in establishing Lochner as the 
paradigmatic anti-canonical economic substantive due process case, and in 
establishing the phrase and concept “Lochner era” in the legal 
community’s consciousness, was almost certainly publication of Laurence 
Tribe’s treatise on constitutional law in 1978.333 Tribe defined the Lochner 
era as lasting between 1897 and 1937, and spent over twenty pages 
explaining why he believed that Lochner and its progeny were wrongly 
decided, consistently using “Lochner” as shorthand for all of the Supreme 
Court’s liberty of contract jurisprudence.334 Tribe also pioneered a modern 
liberal interpretation of Lochner as a case that properly adopted a strong 
role for the judiciary in protecting individual rights, but that failed to 
understand that “economic liberty” was no longer a viable concept in the 
 328. GUNTHER & DOWLING, supra note 317, at 963. 
 329. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 21 (discussing Barnett’s correspondence with Gunther on this point). 
 330. A Hein-on-Line search for “Lochner era” in the “most-cited law reviews” finds thirteen uses 
of the phrase between 1975 and 1978. 
 331. GUNTHER, supra note 327, at 557 (9th edition). 
 332. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (citing G. GUNTHER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 550–96 (9th ed. 1975)) (“As the history of the Lochner era 
demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the 
predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.”). The first use of 
“Lochner era” in a Supreme Court brief was Petitioner’s brief, Dicks v. Naff, 415 U.S. 958 (1974) (No. 
73-1128). 
 333. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). Indeed, an essay published 
on the “Constitution and Economic Rights” just as Tribe’s treatise was coming out never uses the 
phrase “Lochner era,” and indeed (and notably for an essay on this particular topic) barely mentions 
Lochner. Martin Shapiro, The Constitution and Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 74 (M. Judd Harmon ed. 1978). 
 334. Id. at 434–55. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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wake of the industrial revolution. Following publication of Tribe’s treatise, 
use of the phrase “Lochner era” in the law review literature skyrocketed.335 
F. Lochner Today 
By the late 1980s, many constitutional law scholars grew unhappy with 
the traditional critique of Lochner, which, following Justice Holmes, 
criticized the Lochner Court for illegitimate judicial intervention with 
lawmaking by the legislature. With the ascendancy of a conservative 
majority on the Supreme Court, liberals recognized that some of their most 
cherished Warren and Burger Courts substantive due process decisions—
not least, Roe v. Wade336—were vulnerable to being overruled as 
Lochnerian.337 
Professor Barbara Fried notes that “[i]t has been a perennial problem 
for left liberal political theorists over the past forty years. . . to explain 
why the Court is not merely engaged in that most dread of all pursuits, 
‘Lochnerizing’. . . when, for example, it overturns state anti-abortion laws 
or mandates school desegregation.”338 As conservative Hadley Arkes puts 
it, “[t]he devotees of modern liberal jurisprudence may not find Lochner 
congenial, but it is not clear that they can assemble any moral argument 
against it.”339  
Growing discomfort with the traditional critique of Lochner led to 
something of a cottage industry of Lochner reinterpretation among 
constitutional law scholars. While conservatives argue that the current 
 335. A Hein-on-Line search for “Lochner era” in the “most-cited law reviews” finds over sixty 
uses of that phrase between 1979 and 1985. The growing prominence of Lochner in the 1970s is 
illustrated by concurrent editions of a book by Alpheus Thomas Mason. Mason’s 1968 The Supreme 
Court from Taft to Warren contains only one reference to Lochner. Mason’s 1979 The Supreme Court 
from Taft to Burger contains five references to Lochner. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME 
COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER (1979); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT 
TO WARREN (1968). 
 336. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 337. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 31–32 (1990) (criticizing Roe as Lochnerian). Martin Shapiro had warned a decade earlier 
that  
those liberal commentators who applaud the activism of the Warren Court would do well to 
remember that the economic theories of the turn-of-the-century Court were as public interest-
oriented, more clearly articulated, better scientifically grounded, and show greater survival 
value than the sociological, psychological, and criminological theories that shimmered just 
below the surface of much of what the Warren Court did. 
Shapiro, supra note 333, at 80. 
 338. BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND 
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 207 (1998). 
 339. Arkes, supra note 109, at 125. 
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Court should reassess its endorsement of Griswold, Roe, and other cases 
recognizing implicit fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause 
because they are in the same tradition as Lochner,340 many liberal 
constitutional law scholars demur. 
Some scholars have argued that Lochner and Roe are not really in the 
same tradition,341 but, as intimated by Justice Potter Stewart in his 
concurrence in Roe,342 their claims are not persuasive.343 Indeed, the 
recognition that Lochner and Roe are in the same fundamental rights 
tradition has caused other contemporary liberal scholars to reassess their 
understanding of Lochner. Following in the pioneering footsteps of John 
Hart Ely344 and Laurence Tribe, they argue that the Lochner era Court 
chose an appropriate role for the Court—defender of last resort of 
fundamental rights—but simply chose the wrong rights to emphasize; the 
Lochner Court myopically focused on liberty of contract, a right that had 
become anachronistic in a modern industrial economy. Instead, the Court 
should have focused on the civil liberties necessary for a properly-
functioning modern liberal democracy.345 These liberal scholars argue that 
the Court eventually got it right, and Lochner, perhaps, should be 
recognized as a misstep on an otherwise sound path, not an irredeemable 
mistake. Their revisionist view of Lochner has found support in a 
burgeoning literature from legal historians that has effectively debunked 
the traditional view that Lochnerian jurisprudence was based on Social 
Darwinist ideology.346 More recent (and better) scholarship has shown 
 340. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 337. 
 341. E.g., GILLMAN, supra note 27, at 1–18 (attributing Lochner to opposition to class 
legislation); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873–75 (1987) (attributing 
Lochner to the Court’s desire to constitutionalize common law rules and entitlements). For criticism 
from an alternative revisionist perspective, see Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, supra note 24, 
and Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 18, respectively. 
 342. “[I]t was clear to me then, and it is equally clear to me now, that the Griswold decision can 
be rationally understood only as . . . one in a long line of pre-Skrupa cases decided under the doctrine 
of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167–68 (1973) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
 343. As Markus Dubber notes, “Roe and its predecessors came to be thought of as something 
completely new, having to do with novel notions like ‘penumbras’ of enumerated rights and ‘the right 
to privacy’, rather than as a continuation of the struggle to define and limit state power, and the power 
to police in particular.” MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 203 (2005) (internal citation omitted). 
 344. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 345. A position along these lines has been advocated by Ackerman and Fiss. See 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 255–78 (1998); FISS, supra note 316, at 9–21. 
 346. See supra note 27 (citing Bernstein, Cushman, Gillman, etc.) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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that, as discussed previously, Lochner had its roots in natural rights 
ideology and opposition to class legislation.347 
The modern liberal interpretation of Lochner was adopted by the 
Supreme Court’s plurality per curiam opinion in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, in a section attributed to Justice O’Connor.348 O’Connor, 
discussing why overruling Lochner was appropriate in 1937, but 
overruling Roe would not be appropriate in 1992, explained that with 
regard to Lochner,  
[T]he Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed 
unmistakable to most people by 1937, that the interpretation of 
contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally 
false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively 
unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare.349 
Thus, Lochner’s error was not the somewhat aggressive use of substantive 
due process to protect unenumerated individual rights, but the Court’s 
choice to protect liberty of contract.  
Since Casey, Justices Souter and Kennedy have grown increasingly 
bold about associating their substantive due process jurisprudence with the 
jurisprudence of the Lochner era, and even, to some degree, Lochner itself. 
Justice Souter has argued that Lochner was correct to apply the Due 
Process Clause to prohibit arbitrary legislation, but was wrong to apply a 
version of review that he thinks was reminiscent of Dred Scott v. 
Sandford350 in its “absolutist implementation of the standard they 
espoused.”351 By contrast, Souter contends that Meyer and Pierce properly 
applied heightened scrutiny to truly important interests.352  
Souter is nevertheless still willing to use Lochner as an epithet when he 
disagrees with his colleagues’ federalism opinions.353 Indeed, to Justices 
on the “left” of the Rehnquist Court, the majority’s decisions expanding 
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment354 and limiting the scope of the 
Commerce Clause355 are reminiscent of Lochner. In these Justices’ minds, 
 347. See GILLMAN, supra note 27; Bernstein, supra note 291. 
 348. 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992). 
 349. Id. 
 350. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 351. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 352. Id. at 761–62. See generally David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After 
Troxel and Carhart, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1125 (2001) (noting the influence of Meyer and Pierce on 
modern substantive due process jurisprudence in family privacy cases). 
 353. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 354. E.g., id. 
 355. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
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the majority is repeating Lochner’s error in allowing limited-government 
ideology to blind itself to the negative consequences of involving itself in 
limiting the government’s ability to regulate on behalf of the social good. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, meanwhile, 
enthusiastically and unabashedly cites Meyer and Pierce as “broad 
statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause.”356 Unlike prior modern substantive due process cases, in which 
the Court adhered to a strict division between due process rights deserving 
“strict scrutiny” and those deserving only “rational basis” scrutiny, 
Lawrence does not make this distinction, giving the case a much more 
Lochnerian feel. Kennedy’s opinion in State Farm v. Campbell,357 which 
placed strict substantive due process limitations on state punitive damages 
awards, suggests that unlike the Warren Court, the current Court does not 
necessarily disavow meaningful review of government action that affects 
“mere” economic rights, though it is hardly about to revive full-fledged 
Lochnerism.358 
Conservative judges and scholars, for their part, still for the most part 
condemn Lochner for improper “judicial activism.”359 But Lochner’s 
reputation has been sufficiently polished that some leading legal scholars, 
albeit from the libertarian minority, forcefully argue that Griswold and 
Lochner were both correctly decided.360 Scholars from across the political 
spectrum increasingly argue that in completely abandoning Lochner, the 
Court has left important economic rights vulnerable to government 
overreaching.361 
(1995). 
 356. 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
 357. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 358. See also E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (casting the 
deciding vote invalidating an economic regulation on substantive due process grounds). 
 359. See, e.g., A. Raymond Randolph, Barbara K. Olson Memorial Lecture, Federalist Society, 
Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Transcripts/randolphBKO.pdf (criticizing recent 
Supreme Court cases for reviving Lochnerian activism). 
 360. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundation 
for Gay Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 84–93 (“[T]he traditional Lochner framework supports 
Griswold’s outcome without its messy resort to penumbras in the desperate effort to distance itself 
from Lochner.”); see also Barnett, supra note 329 (defending Lochner and praising Justice Kennedy’s 
extension of Griswold in Lawrence); Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the “Political 
Economy” of Lochner v. New York, 1 NYU J.L. & LIB. 515 (2005) (concluding that the primary 
problem with the Court’s Lochnerian jurisprudence was that it was too timid and wishy-washy). 
 361. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 272, at 3–11 (suggesting that the Court was wrong to abandon 
Lochner completely); Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner Court, 4 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 405, 405–06 (1996) (contending that Lochnerian decisions prohibiting monopolization of certain 
occupations were correct); Roger Pilon, How Constitutional Corruption Has Led to Ideological Litmus 
Tests for Judicial Nominees, 7 Cato Policy Analysis No. 446 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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In any event, despite the debate among conservatives, libertarians, and 
liberals over Lochner, Lochnerism is firmly entrenched in American 
jurisprudence by the Court’s “incorporation” of most of the substantive 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. With his focus on an expansive liberty-protective 
interpretation of the Clause in Lochner (and Allgeyer), Justice Peckham’s 
opinions opened the door for Justice McReynolds’ even more expansive 
opinion in Meyer, which in turn continues to serve as the “constitutional 
foundation of innumerable substantive rights that have been proclaimed by 
the Supreme Court in the twentieth century.”362 That the current 
constitutional debate is only over the scope of the Due Process Clause’s 
protection of rights not enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and not over 
whether the Due Process Clause protects substantive rights in the first 
instance, or even whether unenumerated rights are ever protected by the 
Clause, is a testament to the ultimate triumph of Peckham’s vision of the 
Due Process Clause as the source of the Court’s power to act as defender 
of last resort of individual liberties against the states, if not of his specific 
views on the scope of that clause. 
CONCLUSION 
This Lochner retrospective shows that the history of the Lochner case 
has been consistently distorted. The decades-long treatment of Lochner as 
“formalist” served the interests of liberal advocates of sociological 
jurisprudence and legal realism, but was directly contradicted by the 
history (and text!) of the Lochner decision. Moreover, the Lochner 
decision has often been portrayed as an example of the Court clearly 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-446es.html. David Strauss has recently argued that the Lochner Court 
was correct to protect liberty of contract, but that it interpreted the doctrine too broadly. David A. 
Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003). For a similar analysis, see 
Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Personal Liberty, 2003–04 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 9. By contrast with this recent outpouring of sympathy for Lochner, between 1937 (and perhaps 
earlier) and the late 1970s, there were extremely few published scholarly works expressing sympathy 
for Lochner. See, e.g., Albert A. Mavrinac, From Lochner to Brown v. Topeka: The Court and 
Conflicting Concepts of the Political Process, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 641 (1958); Guy Miller Struve, 
The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 
(1967). The most significant work signaling a revival in sympathetic attention to Lochnerian 
jurisprudence was BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980); see also 
William Letwin, Economic Due Process in the American Constitution and The Rule of Law, in 
LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW (Robert L. Cunningham ed. 1979); Eric Mack, In Defense of 
‘Unbridled’ Freedom of Contract, AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY 1 (Jan. l980). 
 362. Donald Drakeman, The Substance of Process: Lochner v. New York, in GREAT CASES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 130, 131 (Robert P. George ed., 2000). 
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favoring the interests of the rich and powerful over those of the poor and 
helpless. In fact, as we have seen, Lochner involved a local dispute 
between small-time bakery owners, mostly former bakery employees 
themselves, who felt put-upon by the bakers’ union, and a bakers’ union 
dominated by individuals of German descent struggling mightily to 
combat competition from workers from other ethnic groups. That this 
dispute has taken on mythic proportions as a battle between “capital” and 
“labor” bespeaks the tendency of academics to write their own ideological 
preoccupations into constitutional history. 
Moreover, the history of Lochner shows that the academic 
community—including historians, political scientists, and law 
professors—can distort the origins and history of an entire line of cases for 
decades before revisionist scholarship finally begins to correct the errors. 
The academic community should be ashamed that for so many years 
scholarly works routinely stated that Lochnerian jurisprudence had its 
origins in “Social Darwinism” without any meaningful supporting 
evidence beyond a misinterpreted line from Holmes’s Lochner dissent. 
Moreover, the more general notion that pre-New Deal due process 
jurisprudence was rooted in radical laissez-faire ideology should have 
been self-refuting to anyone familiar with the relevant cases. 
Lochner also teaches us that the importance the legal community places 
on a particular case may be largely unrelated to the perceived importance 
of the case both at the time it was decided, and for many decades 
thereafter. Lochner was certainly a significant case, but it never achieved 
anti-canonical prominence until the 1970s, when it became a foil for 
debate over Griswold and especially Roe. Ironically, despite attempts of 
Roe opponents to discredit Roe by associating it with Lochner, during the 
Rehnquist Court substantive due process jurisprudence has become 
increasingly and explicitly Lochnerian (in a broad sense) in cases such as 
Casey and Lawrence. 
Largely because of its Lochnerian origins, modern substantive due 
process jurisprudence has been, and remains, doctrinally unstable. Its roots 
lie in Meyer v. Nebraska, but Meyer itself is in the same tradition as, and 
built upon, Lochner. The current Justices who support the protection of 
unenumerated constitutional rights through substantive due process have 
not successfully explained why economic regulation is nearly exempt from 
serious due process scrutiny. Most likely, due process will either expand to 
cover some forms of economic regulation or it will die; as State Farm and 
other rulings suggest, relatively conservative Justices such as Kennedy are 
unlikely to support a doctrine of substantive due process that completely 
ignores overreaching government economic regulation. Moreover, with 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/2
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the controversy over the New Deal fading into memory, the growing 
influence of public choice theory,363 and the resurgence of anti-statist 
economic thought,364 the idea of reviving some limits on government 
regulatory power no longer seems absurd and reactionary. 
Finally, while Lochner seems to be gradually losing the anti-canonical 
status it achieved in the 1970s,365 Lochner’s important role in the debate 
over American constitutionalism is likely to continue for some time. As 
Hadley Arkes notes,  
today we live firmly within the case of Lochner. That case is 
ridiculed, derided, by the right as well as the left, and yet the 
structure of jurisprudence marked by the case is the structure that 
our judges, left and right, choose again, choose anew, whenever 
they are faced with the need to choose.366 
 363. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT FAILURE : A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 
(2002). 
 364. For a lively history of modern economics, emphasizing the free-market branch, see MARK 
SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN ECONOMICS (2001). 
 365. See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 865 (2005) (musing 
over whether there is “anything remaining of Lochner that raises especially interesting questions for 
American constitutional theory”). 
 366. Arkes, supra note 109, at 101. 
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